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 Özet 
Türk ve Yunan taraflarının yeniden yakınlaşmasında her iki tarafın da adımlar 
attığı bilinmektedir. Ancak bu çalışma tekrar yakınlaşma için Yunan tarafının çabaları 
ile sınırlı tutulmuştur. Yunan dış politikasının Avrupalılaşması ve Türkiye’ye karşı 
Yunanistan’ın Birleşme Stratejisi üzerine çok mürekkep harcandı ve çok sayıda 
literatür oluşturuldu. Bu tezin amacı,  bu ikisi arasındaki bağlantıyı kurmaktır. 
Avrupalılaşma, Avrupa Birliği üyelik stratejisini nasıl etkiliyor ve nasıl şekil veriyor? 
Avrupa Birliği ailesine üye olmayan ve revizyonist istekleri olduğu düşünülen bir 
ülkenin bu stratejiyi benimsemede Avrupalılaşmanın etkisi nasıldır? Yunan dış 
politikasına şekil verenlerin gözünden hali hazırdakı strateji, güvenlik endişeleri 
yönünden neden uygun bir çözüm olarak görülüyor? Bu politikanın stratejik önemi 
olduğunu göz önünde bulundurarak, bu kararın arasındaki göstergelerin vurgulanması 
ve stratejinin nasıl yorumlandığının ve izlendiğinin gösterilmesi tezin amacıdır. 
 
Abstract 
Although it is assumed that the improved atmosphere in Greek-Turkish relations since 
1999 is composed of the initiatives undertaken by both sides the paper self-
consciously restricts its case-study to the contribution to this evolution on behalf of 
the Greek side. Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy and Greece’s Engagement 
Strategy towards Turkey during the last decade constitute topics in the name of which 
a lot of literature has been developed. Aim of this thesis is to find out and establish a 
link between them. How is Europeanization able to influence and shape the 
formulation of an EU member state strategy? How can it contribute to the adoption of 
a strategy especially in cases where the targeted state does not belong to the EU 
family and is perceived to hold revisionist aspirations? Why does the currently 
employed strategy seem according to the today’s Greek Foreign Policy Makers the 
proper solution to deal with their security concerns? Assuming that the adoption of 
this policy is of strategic importance the author is interested to highlight the indicator 
behind this decision and to illustrate the way this strategy was interpreted and 
pursued. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In the aftermath of the Cyprus events in 1974 Turkey had been formerly 
perceived by Greece’s Foreign Policy Decision Makers, political elites and public 
opinion as the main threat to Greece’s territorial integrity with special reference to the 
Aegean Sea and Western Thrace. The common participation at NATO from 1952 
seemed incapable of preventing crises and armed conflicts among the two members 
jeopardizing in many cases the existence and the substance of the organization’s 
southeastern flank.1 Greece’s accession at EC proved also not to be an adequate 
solution to deal with its main foreign policy challenge, since its partners from a Greek 
point of view did not initially seem eager to comprehend and share its security 
concerns.2 Although the end of Cold War leaded to the transformation of the military-
defense situation in Europe, Greece remained one of the few states that seemed to 
experience less the occurring changes.3 The newly emerged and globalized context 
did not even theoretically alter its fundamental security and defense dimension 
besides the additional new challenges that had been raised (terrorism, human 
trafficking, and multiple armed conflicts in different regions). 
For more than three decades dealing in the most effective way with the 
conceived threat emanating from the East constituted a question that had drawn the 
attention of political analysts, journalists, international relations’ scholars, military 
and politicians in Greece. A continuous arms race between the two states was for 
many years reflecting the preoccupation that was taking place in the framework of 
                                                 
1 D. Manikas, The World Order in the 21st Century and Greece’s Security [in Greek], [Athens 2004 
ELLHN], p. 74 
2 Y. Stivachtis, “Living with Dilemmas: Greek-Turkish Relations at the Rise of the 21st Century” 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/03_jb00_25.pdf 
3 K. Ifantis, “The New Role of Greece in the Regional System: Trends, Challenges and Capabilities” in 
P.C Ioakimidis (ed.) Greece in the European Union: The New Role & the New Agenda,  [Athens 
Ministry of Press and Mass Media 2002], p. 257 
5 
their bilateral relations.4 Greek policy towards Turkey had focused on how to prevent 
a Turkish attack on Greece and pursued strategies that were perceived to constitute a 
theoretical deviation from the European approach to security by means of achieving 
regional stability.5 
After 1999 a thaw is observed in Greek-Turkish relations. Many scholars and 
people have attributed a “wind of change” in their relations to the understanding that 
the people from both sides showed to each other during the devastating earthquakes in 
August and September of 1999. The historical legacies and prejudices were 
questioned while facing a common human tragedy. The interaction among the people 
was supposed to pave the way for further cooperation in a political level. Moreover 
personal initiatives undertaken by the two Foreign Ministers, Cem and Papandreou, 
during that period supposedly contributed to the change of climate in the bilateral 
relations. Others sought to ascribe the current rapprochement into commonly shared 
geopolitical considerations that have emerged in the aftermath of Soviet Union’s and 
Yugoslavia’s demise. From another perspective the involvement of third parties 
(USA, EU) seemed to constitute a crucial variable in the amelioration of their 
relations. 
 Without ignoring the importance of all these indicators this paper is 
examining the contribution of the Greek side to the current improvement of the 
bilateral relations. Which was the underlying factor that influenced Greeks to reshape 
their policy towards Turkey? Which was the variable that leaded them to the 
embracement of a strategy non-similar to the one that had been adopted so far? What 
                                                 
4 G. Georgiou, P. Kapopoulos, S. Lazaretou, “Modeling Greek-Turkish Rivalry: An Empirical 
Investigation of Defense Spending Dynamics” in Journal of Peace Research, 33:2, p. (May 1996), p. 
229-239  
5 A. Evin, “The future of Greek-Turkish Relations” in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 5:3 
September 2005, p. 395-404 and E. Peteinarakis, “The Kantian Peace and Greek-Turkish Relations”, 
Master’s Thesis, Jun 2007 http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA473386&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf 
6 
was the rationale behind pursuing the policy that is going to be described in the 
following pages? How was this strategy formulated? These are the questions the 
current thesis is concerned with. 
Although the author is aware of the fact that the realm of the recent 
rapprochement is composed of the initiatives assumed by both sides the paper self-
consciously restricts its case-study to the Greek side. Europeanization of Greek 
Foreign Policy as well as Greece’s Engagement Strategy towards Turkey during the 
last decade constitutes topic for which a lot of ink has been spilled and a lot of 
literature has been developed. Aim of this thesis is to find out and establish a link 
between them. How can Europeanization influence and shape the formulation of an 
EU member state strategy? How can it contribute to the adoption of a strategy 
especially in cases where the targeted state does not belong to the EU and is perceived 
to hold revisionist aspirations? Why does the currently employed strategy seem in the 
eyes of today’s Greek Foreign Policy Makers the proper solution for their security 
concerns? Assuming that the adoption of this policy is of strategic importance the 
author is interested to highlight the indicator behind this decision and to illustrate the 
way this strategy was interpreted and pursued. 
The sources which contributed to the formulation of this paper consist of 
international relations’ and political science’s books, journals, magazines, newspapers 
and web links. It should be noted that the content of the term “engagement” is based 
on the assumptions that Ifantis, in the context of several articles, has provided with. 
Regarding the attempt to approach the conceptual framework of Europeanization the 
author exploits the existing literature as it has been developed mainly by the papers of 
Radaelli, Ladrech and Olsen. With respect to the link between Europeanization and 
Foreign Policy in general, Smith’s work might facilitate the understanding of any 
7 
relationship that exists among the two parameters. The description of the theoretical 
framework of engagement strategy will be ascribed into the combination of three 
different theories: democratic peace theory, liberal institutionalism and 
interdependence theories. The works of Doyle and Nye constitute the main literature 
on which the approach of engagement as a concept has been theoretically based. 
Several articles of Ioakimidis, Tsardanidis, Stavridis and Economides will 
help the author to describe how Europeanization has generally influenced Greek 
Foreign Policy. The link between Europeanization and Greece’s engagement strategy 
towards Turkey relies to a considerable extent upon Tsakonas’ and Dokos’ texts and 
approaches. The analysis of the way engagement strategy was adopted by Greece 
towards Turkey is mainly founded on articles published in political and financial 
Greek newspapers as well as diplomatic magazines. 
 The first part of the paper is dedicated to the analysis and determination of a 
variable which according to the author has functioned in a catalytic way for the Greek 
side to adopt and pursue the aforementioned policy towards Turkey today. The 
meaning of Europeanization is the question which the first chapter is seeking to focus 
on. Which are the theories that have been so far emerged for the definition of this 
term? Which is the link between Europeanization and foreign policy of a state? How 
can Europeanization exert its influence to the foreign policy of a country considering 
that foreign policy in general as a study possesses a distinct nature which enables it to 
maneuver between international relations and domestic politics’ studies? These are 
the questions this part is concerned with. 
The second chapter will focus on the definition of engagement strategy in 
general. How is security perceived in the context of the newly emerged and globalized 
world? What is the theoretical background of engagement and how does it distinguish 
8 
from containment? How is Europeanization able to influence a state pursuing an 
engagement policy? 
The third one is describing the phases that Europeanization had to go through 
in the Greek Foreign Policy realm. How is Europeanization interpreted in the Greek 
realities? Could someone claim that Greek Foreign Policy today has been exposed, 
influenced and shaped by the Europeanization dynamics? 
The fourth one is analyzing the way engagement strategy was implemented in 
the framework of Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey. Why is Turkey regarded by 
Greeks as a potential threat for Greece’s territorial integrity? What was the content of 
the containment strategy which had been pursued so far? What was the rationale 
beyond altering its strategy? How did Europeanization influence Greek Foreign 
Policy decision makers to pursue an engagement policy? 
The 5th and the 6th chapter seek to highlight the way engagement strategy was 
pursued by Greek officials towards Turkey. The former analyzes the political 
background on which this policy was based while the latter describes the respective 
financial one. While pursuing this policy which had been constructed on these two 
pillars have Greeks managed to deal effectively with their perceived security 
challenges? These are the issues the current paper is concerned with. 
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CHAPTER A: EUROPEANIZATION AND FOREIGN POLICY 
1. Introduction 
The developments of a post Cold-War Europe through the dissolution of 
Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern Europe combined with an increasingly 
interdependent European continent constitute significant changes witnessed by the 
scholars of International Studies and challenging basic assumptions of Foreign Policy 
Analysis.6 These changes observed also by the Greek Foreign Policy makers made 
them realize the imperative need to embrace policies adapted to the newly emerged 
realities. 
 Concerning the Greek case it is inconceivable to comprehend the 
fundamentals of its renewed Foreign Policy (with special reference towards Turkey) if 
the consequences emanating from a concept that has catalytically contributed to its 
transformation are not taken into account. This concept is named Europeanization. 
             In the framework of the current thesis, this term is used as the proper 
analytical tool and independent variable that will facilitate to comprehend an outcome 
or a dependent variable regarding Greece’s Engagement Strategy towards Turkey. 
Although variety of reasons forced Greece to transform its policy towards its neighbor 
the main factor that could include all the transforming-elements is reflected in an 
important extent by “Europeanization”. The emerging questions are the following: 
How can be Europeanization defined and how can it contribute to the transformation 
of a foreign policy?  
 
 
                                                 
6 J. M. Rothgreb, “The Changing International Context for Foreign Policy”, in L. Neck, J. A. K. Hey, 
P. J. Haney (eds.) Foreign Policy Analysis Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1995. 
10 
2. The meaning of Europeanization 
  It constitutes a term commonly used in political science in the name of which 
many things have been written. Aim of this chapter is to highlight some components 
of this concept that might be useful for the deeper comprehension of the changes 
occurred or occurring in the context of Greek Foreign Policy realities. Some 
theoretical approaches might contribute to the understanding of the concept. 
Radaelli is defining Europeanization as “a) construction b) diffusion c) 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
“ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are the first defined and 
consolidated in the making of EU decisions and often incorporated within the logic of 
domestic discourse and identities”.7 Ladrech states that Europeanization depicts “an 
incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that 
EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of 
national politics and policy making”.8 Inherent in this conception is the notion that the 
actors involved redefine their interests and behavior in order to get aligned with the 
imperative norms and logic of EC/EU membership. It connotes the processes and the 
mechanisms by which European-institution building may change cause at domestic 
level.9 The emerging question that should be raised is the following one: how could 
be these European values, norms, practices and processes that seem to compose the 
whole “Europeanization structure” identified ?10 
                                                 
7 Radaelli C. M, “Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change” European 
Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 4 (2000) N° 8; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2000-008.pdf 
8 Ladrech R, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions. The case of France.” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 32: 1, (1994) 69-99 
9 Börzel T. & Risse T, When Europe hits home: Europeanization and Domestic Change in European 
Integration online Papers (EIop) Vol. 4 (2000) No. 15 http://www.eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm 
10 S. Bulmer, “Theorizing Europeanization” in P. Gaziano & M. Vink (eds.) Europeanization New 
Research Agenda[ Palgrave Macmillan 2003]  p. 47-48 and Featherstone K, “In the Name of Europe”, 
in K. Featherstone & C.M. Radaelli (eds.)  The Politics of Europeanization [Oxford University Press 
2003], p. 7 
11 
What might consciously be derived by thinking of the Europeanization 
concept are the values on the basis of which the European integration process has 
been built. The end of protectionism, import substitution, and nationalization allowing 
the emergence of vibrant market societies and powerful business interests could be 
considered some representative examples. European Union and almost every notion 
dealing with the up-to date Europe is composed by the aforementioned elements. In 
the words of Keridis growth of a middle class, the expansion of a mobile, urban and 
consumer society; the arrival of economic immigrants; and the eruption of ethnic 
conflicts in the vicinity have stimulated a debate over identity that challenges 
traditional conceptions of the nation-state and demands an institutional and cultural 
national redefinition. The image of a state business-friendly, more outward looking, 
more future and achievement oriented and tolerant to cultural and religion diversities 
seems close to what is called Europeanized.11 As Ioakimidis points out the loosening 
of the grip of the state over the social institutions and the reinforcement of the latter’s 
autonomy along with the creation of new possibilities for the participation of pressure 
and interest groups in the policy-making process at national and European levels are 
contributing to the same direction.12 
Olsen seeking to “illumine the depths” of the whole process ascribes its existence 
and substance into five components: 
? changes in external boundaries that signify a territorial reach of a governance 
system and the degree to which Europe as continent is becoming a unified 
political sphere 
                                                 
11 Keridis D, “Domestic Developments and Foreign Policy Greek Policy Toward Turkey” in Keridis D. 
& Triantaphyllou D. (eds.) Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization (Brassey’s 2001), p. 2-
18 
12 Ioakimidis P. C , “The Europeanization of Greece: an overall assessment” in Iokimidis P.C (ed.) 
Greece in the European Union: The New Role and the New Agenda (Athens Ministry of Press and 
Mass Media 2002),  p.49-63 
12 
? developing institutions at European level that illustrates a centre-building with a 
collective action capacity providing some degree of coordination and coherence 
? central penetration of national systems of governance in the context of which 
Europeanization involves the division of responsibilities and powers between 
different levels of governance searching for the “golden mean” between unity and 
diversity, central coordination and local autonomy 
? exporting forms of political organization according to which Europeanization 
focuses on relations with non Europe-actors and institutions and the “path” that 
leads Europe to find a place in larger world order 
? a political unification project that highlights the degree to which Europe becomes 
more unified and stronger political entity in terms of territorial space, central-
building, domestic adaptation and how European developments interact with 
systems of governance outside the European continent.13 
Seeking to simplify Olsen’s typology, the principal distinction deriving from 
these aspects oscillates between two understandings of Europeanization: the transfer 
from “Europe” to other jurisdictions of policy, institutional arrangements, rules, 
beliefs, or norms, on the one hand; and building European capacity as an outcome of 
the convergence and interaction among different polities and policies of different 
countries-members of the European structure on the other. In this perspective we 
could imagine Europeanization as a “two-way process” entailing a “bottom-up” (or 
uploading) and “top-down” dimensions14 whose content the following part of this 
chapter will attempt to streamline. 
                                                 
13 J. P Olsen, “The many faces of Europeanization” in Journal of Common Market Studies 40:5 pp. 
921-952, (2002) 
14 Börzel T. & Risse T. “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe” in The Politics of 
Europeanization K. Featherstone & C.M. Radaelli (eds.) (Oxford University Press 2003), p. 57-80   
13 
From the other side it is worth noting that Europeanization should not be 
regarded as identical with the European Integration process. It is a fact that its 
substance might to some extent depend on the latter one. What can be observed is a 
kind of interaction, maybe interdependence among these meanings but not 
identification. European Integration process implies all the necessary procedures and 
changes emanating from the European bodies’ dictates that should occur in the 
domestic environment of the member-states in order to formulate an increasingly 
unified EC/EU both in political and financial terms. The Europeanization concept 
includes more than the consequences (domestic changes) occurring on account of 
incorporating the acquis communautaire. It carries a voluntary dimension of 
incorporating change beyond the obligatory imposed adaptation to EU templates. 
Europeanization analyzes what happens to domestic institutions and actors. It 
describes the outcomes of the occurring changes but not the changes themselves as 
the European integration process reflects. This means that Europeanization entails 
both the willingness and capacity of governments to define and execute national 
policies by placing them into the wider context of EU objectives. It dictates that the 
imperatives, logic and norms of the EU, as described before, become intrinsically 
“implanted” into domestic policy, to the extent that the distinction between European 
and domestic policy requirements progressively ceases to exist.15  
 Exploiting the approaches that have been developed so far concerning the 
definition of the aforementioned concept the following part of the current chapter is 
attempting to address the following question: how does Europeanization influence 
foreign policy? 
 
                                                 
15 Ioakimidis P. C (2004) “Contradictions between policy and performance” in Featherstone K. & 
Ifantis K. (eds.) Greece in a Changing Europe Between European Integration and Balkan 
Disintegration (Manchester University Press 2004), p. 33-34 
14 
3. Europeanization and Foreign Policy 
3.1 The distinct nature of Foreign Policy 
The analysis of the impact that Europeanization may have on the Foreign 
Policy of a member-state does not constitute an easy task if the distinct nature of 
Foreign Policy is taken into account. Its substance relies on its placement on the outer 
sphere of the ‘two-level game’ where the statesman is located neither internally nor 
externally but on the border, trying to find the medium way between two worlds.16 
 The applicability of Europeanization on the unique area of foreign policy has 
to deal with many difficulties because the substance of the latter differs from other 
policy areas in a number of aspects. In the ongoing, deepening and widening 
European integration process, and particularly after the abandonment of national 
currencies, co-operation in this field touches upon one of the last remaining core 
tenets of national sovereignty.17 
This is reflected by the substance of the pillars on which EC/EU has been built 
in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty.  The legislative content of the first pillar 
(European Communities) which has to deal with the formulation of the EU member-
states’ domestic environment that will theoretically contribute to the establishment 
and maintenance of a transparent, integrated and single European market is based on 
the initiatives undertaken by the supranational bodies of EC with special reference to 
the European Commission. Its supranational character lies on the fact that the 
members it consists of, although picked up by the national governments, are 
functioning and working there on behalf of the EC as an entity and not of the states 
they are coming from. The legislative framework they are producing is supposed, to 
an important extent, to be directly embraced and implemented on the member states’ 
                                                 
16 Putnam R, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the logic of two-level games” in International 
Organization (1988) 42:3, p. 427-460  
17 Major C, “‘Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy- Undermining or Rescuing the Nation 
State” in Politics 2005,  25:3, p. 175-190 
15 
domestically legislative realm disabling the intervention of the respective national 
governments. 
This is not the case for the second pillar, CFSP. Its structure shows that the 
majority of the decisions are taken by the Council of Ministers which constitutes an 
inter-governmental body of the EU. That means that the European Foreign Policy and 
the formulation of a common European stance towards some external issues 
presuppose the cooperation, the co-ordination and most importantly the consensus 
among all its national governments-members. The existence of any possible 
disagreement or deviation on behalf of one or more member states towards a specific 
question allows it/them to take advantage of its/their veto power. This with its turn 
might encumber the creation of common European voice towards issues that occur in 
its external environment. This shows also that CFSP has not reached the integration 
and institutionalization point the first pillar has. Why is this occurring? 
Although the international system is surrounded by important non-state actors, 
the dominant paradigm in international relations still conceives of foreign policy 
matters as essentially the domaine reserve of sovereign governments, considered 
outside and above partisan domestic debate, directly and insolubly linked to the 
preservation of national sovereignty and highly symbolically entrusted to the national 
executive.18 Consequently, defining ‘Europeanization’ as the main explaining factor 
of foreign policy at national level includes the risk of overestimating its impact if the 
importance of other endogenous (domestic) or exogenous (international) influences 
has not drawn the proper attention. The foreign policies are exposed to a number of 
pressures incentives for change which act at the same time as Europeanization, 
sometimes in similar directions, sometimes in completely opposite. Some of those 
                                                 
18 Wong R., ‘Foreign Policy’ in Gaziano P. & Vink M. Europeanization New Research Agendas 
[Palgrave Macmillan 2003], p. 321 
16 
factors are closely related to European Integration or affected by it keeping a separate 
explaining power and some should not be confused and merged under the 
‘Europeanization label’.19 That’s why factors are grouped in two spheres: 
? Domestic sphere 
• Differences in national policy making styles have remained significant. For 
instance, although Greece and Germany both belong to EU they perceive in a 
different way their external environment due to their location in different regions. 
This differentiation on their perception might lead to a consequent differentiation 
of the way they handle issues entangled with their foreign policy concerns. 
Different financial capabilities play also crucial role for the formulation of foreign 
policy. An economically developed state might adopt in a more effective way 
what is called financial diplomacy than another whose capabilities hinder the 
employment of this kind of policy. 
• Some countries have been through important processes of political change and 
transition which have occurred at the same time as Europeanization 
(democratization processes) 
• Changes in the domestic sphere can emanate from the actions of party politics, 
political events or public opinion pressures. The domestic political arena generates 
a number of pressures and demands on foreign policy makers.20 The adoption of a 
policy converged to the dictates of EU might emerge from unilateral initiatives 
undertaken by an influential leader, political party or effective lobby.  Therefore it 
is essential to separate them from the effects deriving from the European 
Integration process. 
                                                 
19 Vaquer J, ‘Europeanization and Foreign Policy’ Working Paper No. 21 April 2001 
http://selene.uab.es/_cs_iuee/catala/obs/Working%20Papers/wp212002.htm 
20 Hagan J,  ‘Domestic Policy Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy’ in Neack L, Hey J., 
Haney P, p. 117 
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? International sphere 
• The scholars of European studies should be aware of the effects of globalization 
and the emergence of global politics on foreign policy. Even if European 
Integration might consider that it constitutes one of the expressions-aspects of this 
development it would be useful to separate the effects which are general to the 
whole world and those who are specific to the framework of the European Union 
and in particular to the foreign policies of EU member states 
• The end of bio-polarity and the dissolution of Soviet Union brought a significant 
change to the equation in which foreign policy makers situated their own 
countries.21 
3.2. Europeanization and Foreign Policy 
The lack of increased institutionalism in terms of the Foreign Policy of EU, as 
described before and of supranational power makes Europeanization of foreign policy 
seem as a learning process about good policy practice for which the EU sets the scene, 
offering the forum for discussion and a platform for policy transfer as opposed to 
obligatory imposed adaptation.22 This means that the newly emerged instrumental 
trajectory of CFSP, despite its intergovernmental character, aims to imbed the interest 
calculations of EU member states to the general EU framework. Rather than being 
committed to what is narrowly perceived as national right or interest EU members are 
supposed to learn entangle many of their foreign policy positions with collectively 
determined goals and values. They should gradually become aware of the fact that 
rational decision-making in this case relies to the social norms of the group rather than 
satisfying self-oriented instrumental utility, as described before. The EU member 
                                                 
21 Vaquer J. 2001 
22 Bulmer & Radaelli (2004) ‘The Europeanization of National Policy?’ Queen’s Paper on 
Europeanisation, 1/2004 p. 12 http://www.qub.ac.uk/ies-old/onlinepapers/poe1-04.pdf. 
 
18 
states seem to embrace a general rule to avoid employing fixed positions on important 
foreign policy questions and consult each other. The contributing parts start to 
perceive themselves as colleagues bearing in their mind and sometimes sharing each 
others’ views and not as policy experts focused to fulfill only national goals. The way 
this foreign policy system has been built seeks to orient the EU members towards 
consensus-building and the establishment of common understandings and interests 
which might pave the way for joint actions.23 
This procedure reflects a bottom-up relation between Europeanization and 
national foreign policies. The attempt on behalf of the member-states to enmesh their 
national interests and the handling of them to the EU framework reveals an effort to 
upload their policies onto European level. Taking into account the opinions and the 
positions of the other states concerning particular issues they are concerned with 
“incarnates” this bottom-up approach of the Europeanization of their foreign policy. 
The effort of a member state to convince the other partners that the issue it is 
concerned with should not be restricted to national views but faced under a prism 
which reflects the wider EU positions mirrors one more aspect of this Europeanization 
approach. 
One of the main elements on which EU has sought to construct its stance 
towards non-EU states is the economic one. In its external relations the existence of a 
financial character is more than evident. Aiming to tackle poverty in developing 
countries EU is the world's largest donor of development funding.24 One of the bases 
on which European Neighbourhood Policy has been constructed is the adoption of 
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economic instruments in order, as it claims, to reinforce existing and sub-regional 
cooperation and provide them with a “road map” for economic development.25 
 These collective actions in combination with the aforementioned 
consultations require EU states to gradually adapt their own foreign policies. Rather 
than dealing almost exclusively with narrowly defined national issues, issues referring 
to its problematic relations with neighbouring countries a member state has to face a 
broadened foreign policy agenda which is emanating from its identity as an EU 
member. The national foreign policy through its participation in the EU institutions 
acquires a strong economic element and more generally elements of “low politics”. 
While a traditional approach can be interpreted as primarily implying the management 
of ‘high politics issues’ the widened policy agenda as an outcome of state’s 
participation at EU operations has included issues such as environment, trade, 
technology, agriculture and culture.26 All these reflect the other dimension of 
Europeanization’s influence to the formulation of the foreign policy of a state, the top-
down approach. This means that instruments, processes, norms and foreign policy 
making style adopted by the EU become gradually integral part of national foreign 
policy realm on behalf of the participant states. 
4. Conclusions 
Europeanization process, as it will be described below, is able to provide a 
state’s foreign policy that has been pursued so far towards its security concerns with a 
different substance. In the Greek case the discussion is not restricted in simple 
changes in the framework of its foreign policy. It is able to contribute to the transition 
from a traditional approach that Greek foreign policy makers had embraced towards 
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Turkey “incarnated” by a contentious “containment strategy” to engagement. The 
following chapter is dedicated to the theoretical analysis of the “engagement strategy” 
and its linkage with Europeanization. 
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CHAPTER B: ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 
1. Introduction 
The aim of the previous chapter was to delineate Europeanization’s role as 
independent variable that seeks to “operationalize” the respective dependent one, with 
special reference to one state’s foreign policy strategy. The analysis and the 
conceptualization of this dependent variable constitute the topic which the current 
chapter is attempting to illustrate. What does engagement strategy mean? How can it 
be compared towards containment? Which is the theoretical background on which it is 
based? Which is the rationale for a state beyond adopting this strategy? How can 
Europeanization operating as “independent variable” influence one state’s decision to 
employ this strategy? These are the questions which this chapter will be concerned 
with. 
In the context of an increasingly globalized and interdependent world some 
neo-realist assumptions seem capable of being applied in the up-to date realities as 
they have emerged in the aftermath of Soviet Union’s dissolution. According to the 
first one the international system is likely to keep its anarchic structure and nature 
bearing in mind that “anarchy” is not necessarily identified with chaos but it implies 
that no central authority exists which would be able to control every state’s 
behavior.27 
The second one implies that the absence of formal relations in a universal 
context that would guarantee a kind of sub-ordination among the states which still 
operate as important actors in the renewed international system forces them to take all 
the necessary means that would ensure their own security. Although the latter term 
(security) is subject to further questioning regarding its definition, the chapter self 
                                                 
27 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 88 
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consciously restricts its meaning to safeguarding of sovereignty. In this sense states 
are supposed to behave as instrumentally rational actors.28 This doesn’t seem to be the 
fact. For neo-realist writers with special reference to Mearsheimer, the modern 
international politics is surrounded by a relentless security competition taking place in 
a self-help realm.29 In compliance with this view states are obliged to confront “an 
irresolvable uncertainty” about military preparations made by other states. According 
to him, this does not allow them to act as rational actors but it forces them to remain 
mistrustful of each other.30 In order to attain security they engage in both internal 
(military) and external (alliances) balancing tasks aiming to deter aggressive 
competitors31. Which are the channels through which they are able to ensure in the 
most effective way their own security? 
2. Containment Strategy 
As said before in the face of immediate and future external threat the primary 
motivation of every state is to enhance its own security especially in cases where the 
latter is supposed to be questioned by revisionist claims posed by another state. The 
level of threat that a state poses to the other depends on many components, i.e. its 
aggregate power, geographic proximity, perceived revisionist or expansionist 
ambitions and offensive capabilities.32 Although a lot has been said as regards 
different strategies that a state is supposed to pursue and employ towards the one that 
is claimed to be the revisionist one in order to guarantee in the most possibly effective 
way its national-state interests, in this chapter the interest is focused on two strategies 
                                                 
28 J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise’ of International Institutions’ in M. Brown, S. M. Lynn and St. 
E. Miller (eds.) The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1995), p. 336 
29 Ibid. 
30 J. Baylis, “International and global security in the post-cold war era” in J. Baylis & St. Smith (eds.) 
The Globalization of World Politics [Oxford University Press 2005], p. 303-4 
31 Th. Couloumbis & K. Ifnatis, “Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean” in Journal The Review 
of International Affairs, 2:2 (Winter 2002), p. 3 
32 Randal L. Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In” in 
International Security, 19:1, (Summer 1994), p. 75 
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among which states are maneuvering in order to ensure their own survival: 
containment and engagement. 
Containment constitutes a strategy that aims to cut down hostile candidate 
states that hold regional hegemony before they emerge, or in case they do so, it is the 
one that “prevents them from either expanding territorially or exerting overweening 
influence over political and economic affairs of states that come within the aspiring 
hegemony’s orbit”.33 The conceptual background of this policy can be attributed to 
Kennan’s ideas that influenced the American policy towards Soviet Union during the 
Cold War. According to them containment was generally identified with a general 
sense of blocking the expansion of Soviet influence through defending above all else 
the world’s major centers of industrial power against Soviet expansion: Western 
Europe, Japan, and the United States.34 
A state which pursues a containment policy aims to keep the perceived as rival 
state into limits that would encumber the fulfillment of its revisionist claims, as these 
are perceived. This strategy presupposes that the state towards which it is pursued is 
seeking to carry out expansionist aspirations while the one which initiates it attempts 
to preserve the currently formulated status quo. The former is considered as non-
status quo power seeking to change norms of bilateral relations. Containment strategy 
includes the usage of deterrence on behalf of the initiating state towards the 
theoretically aggressive one. This bears in mind the “balance of power” theories 
which had been developed in the Cold-War period. In this context the state pursuing 
this policy is dedicating a part of its own national income and budget to the 
amplification of its own military capabilities. The dictates of defense concerns force 
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governments to spend money for the purchase of equipments which would enable 
them to respond in the most possible effective way in case the opposition would fulfill 
its expansionist threats or increase the credibility of the response towards a possible 
attack. That is why under certain conditions the state may focus on expanding its 
security preparedness through internal mobilization of military resources.35 
The viability of this strategy pillar is subject to sort of questioning. Even in 
case a country possesses the necessary resources and the proper mechanisms to 
mobilize them, a possible extraction of them may provide short-term military security 
but it will entail a cost of weakening the long-term economy and therefore the long-
term military potential and security of state. It should be also noted that abstracting 
money for military concerns causes difficulties to a state to fulfill domestic welfare 
goals both in short term as well as in the long run (guns-butter trade off). A possible 
inability to satisfy these goals can possibly lead to social discontent which might 
decrease the political support for the government to remain in power. Military 
expenditures can undermine the ability of the regime to keep its electoral basis by 
diverting resources which in other case they would exploit them for the distribution of 
financial rewards to its coalition partners.36 
In case this kind of deterrence strategy does not seem able to protect 
effectively the state’s interests the latter might decide to seek alliances or to become 
member of it. Small states join alliances because they become aware that they can not 
attain the goal of their survival alone and the fulfillment of their protection 
expectations depends more on the strength and credibility of larger patrons than on 
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their own capabilities.37 In the framework of preserving the status quo it will use the 
means at its disposal, including those provided by the alliance. The rationale beyond 
the decision of participating at an alliance rests upon the hope that the latter will 
provide the containment pursuing state with some security guarantees in response 
towards an immediate security threat. Alliance formation or participation at an 
alliance can also entail a rapid infusion of funds and other resources, including 
military expertise and equipment.38 
Besides the economic benefits that the state might draw from its participation 
at an alliance it can use the latter as a diplomatic leverage towards the opponent 
maximizing the cost for the rival in case the last one carries out its threats. In the 
context of it the supposedly endangered member is seeking to convince its partners to 
align their policies with it. Thus, in case the expansion seeking state aims to cooperate 
or to apply to be provided with a membership-status of the same alliance the other one 
is searching for every possible path that might block this evolution. Any possible 
cooperation between the before mentioned alliance and the rival should be supposedly 
interrupted. A state which initiates a containment policy is reluctant to enable the 
revisionist one to obtain the diplomatic mechanisms and tools with which the former 
has been already equipped and exerting its influence to it. Keeping the expansionist 
state marginalized and isolated from possible allies in order to avoid the enhancement 
of its own diplomatic leverage constitutes another pillar of this containment strategy.    
Leaving aside the alliances or other institutions, attention should be paid also 
in case the theoretically threatened state becomes member of EC. In the framework of 
initiating its containment policy it perceives EC membership as the proper means 
which would provide it with bargaining advantage and negotiating leverage in its 
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dealings with its rival. The complex nature and character of EC composed by supra-
national and inter-governmental instruments can not be compared to any other 
institution and alliance. It is supposedly a field in the framework of which a state feels 
that it westernizes its own national interests. Besides its inter-governmental elements 
the supranational instruments are observing, supervising and regulating the relations 
among their members disabling every possible revisionist claims or possibility of 
changing the borders. This does not seem to be the case regarding the alliances in the 
context of which due to their inter-state character, there is no instrument above the 
member-states that would prevent any tensions between them. In this EC field a 
member state feels more secure than it could feel in any other alliance. It perceives 
itself as possessing a diplomatic leverage towards the theoretically revisionist one. 
Any possible attack on behalf of the latter is supposed to cause an immediate response 
not only by the threatened state but also by its other EC partners. This maximizes the 
cost for the expansionist state to fulfill its revisionist aspirations. This way the 
deterrence strategy obtains supposedly further credibility. 
 The containment policy initiating state is seeking to marginalize and isolate 
the rival from EC. Even in case the majority of EC members would opt for 
cooperation with the rival, the theoretically exposed to threat state, exploiting the 
intergovernmental character of Council of Minister’s which demands consensus for 
external relations’ procedures is able through veto to block and interrupt opposition’s 
relations with EC. Its rationale lies on its fear that a possible cooperation between EC 
and the rival will undermine its own strategic position towards the latter. Since it 
holds its participation as beneficial for the protection of its interests and the suitable 
diplomatic leverage towards the opposing it seems reluctant to share the advantages it 
is supposed to exploit under the EU membership label with the state which is 
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theoretically possessing revisionist aspirations. The use of EC mechanisms as a short-
term instrument against its rival seems an attractive solution for the implementation of 
the containment strategy.39 
3. Engagement Strategy 
In contrast to containment, engagement strategy has been notionally 
constructed on different theoretical fundamentals and assumptions. Engagement 
strategy rests upon a strategic mode of action, in the framework of which building of 
interdependencies and dialogues on behalf of this policy pursuing state along with 
seeking to incorporate the targeted state into institutions it already belongs to might 
shape target state’s preferences and supposedly aggressive attitude.40 The roots of this 
policy should be searched in the combination of three international relations’ 
approaches which function in a complementary way with each other in order to justify 
theoretically the engagement strategy’s substance: “democratic peace theory”, “liberal 
institutionalism” and “interdependence theory”. 
 Democratic peace theory, rooted in Immanuel Kant’s essay, Perpetual Peace, 
came into political science’s surface in 1980’s. Its prevailing argument was 
presupposing that democracies sharing common liberal values and norms do not fight 
against each other. Based on the Kantian logic it was stating, according to its advocate 
M. Doyle, that democratic representation, an ideological commitment to human rights 
and transnational interdependence are adequate conditions to justify the “peace-
prone” tendencies of democratic states. If some of the states have not internalized and 
absorbed these values then the logic of accommodation would give its way to the 
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logic of power making these states be war-prone.41 Supporters of this concept also 
believe that democracies are more likely to resolve mutual conflicts of interest on the 
basis of shared norms and institutional constraints which are supposed to restrain 
them from escalating their disputes to the point where they can threaten to use 
military force against each other.42 
 A field where common norms and constraints can be shared and protected 
among the states is theoretically provided by the supporters of Liberal 
Institutionalism. The emergence of a new “globalized system” reflected the 
imperative need to adopt a more “geocentric” approach in the international relations’ 
study than a “nation-centered” one. The rapidly increasing earth problems couldn’t be 
handled with the “nation-centered” way of thinking that the previous century has 
bequeathed.43 The advocates of this theory share a conviction that institutionalized 
cooperation between them is creating opportunities to establish and consolidate 
greater security conditions in the following years. According to their argumentation 
institutions can provide to conflict parties a common access to information which 
might lead to a gradual elimination of the misperceptions and prejudices that might 
had traditionally contributed to the formulation of tensions between each other. They 
have the ability also to decrease transaction costs, make bilateral commitments obtain 
an increasing credibility and generate new fields for cooperation.44 The developments 
within the EC that had reconciled competition within Western Europe in the aftermath 
of WWII are used as evidence of their argumentation.  
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In the framework of these institutions a possible cooperation might lead to 
interdependent relations. “Interdependence” refers to situations in which actors or 
events in different parts of a system affect each other.45 It examines under which 
occasions does the cultivation of economic ties, with special reference to the fostering 
of economic interdependence as a conscious state strategy lead to important and 
predictable changes in the foreign policy of a target state which possesses revisionist 
aspirations in military terms.46 According to this theory since trade and foreign 
investments increase, the incentives to ensure these needs using military 
determination and occupation decrease. Besides, the financial connection between 
two initially rival countries promotes the communication of “private players” and the 
governments on behalf of sides. The increasing communication with its turn is 
expected to improve the political relations and the cooperation between the countries. 
This financial exchange also generates that kind of benefits both for the exporters and 
the consumers that create a kind of dependence in the foreign markets. Under this 
angle, the perspective of a supposed conflict would have a negative impact on the 
financial relations between the participants and would endanger their profits emerged 
from the trade. That’s why these groups would put pressure on the governments in 
order to avoid this potential conflict danger. 
 Based on these approaches it should be stressed that engagement policy in 
general can be identified with a strategic action with the help of which the initiator 
aims to manipulate the attitude of the target actor through the combination of 
incentives and restraints that might derive from the dictates of international 
institutions in which the former seeks to enmesh it. The goal of the pursuing this 
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policy state is to re-shape the “revisionist” state’s preferences in a pre-determined 
direction which will be aligned with its own preferences. Its rationale relies on the 
intention to induce the opponent power to embrace both foreign and domestic policies 
in line with the norms of the international institution it wants to integrate it into and 
the initiator already belongs to. In case the targeted state gets adapted to the pressures 
and the norms emanating from this institution, according to the before described 
theories, the logic of accommodation and not of power will prevail in the formulation 
of its foreign policy.47 
 This policy is accompanied by an economic pillar. By economic engagement 
what can be implied is a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with the 
adversary aiming to change its attitude and improve the bilateral relations. This pillar 
relies on increasing levels of trade and investments aiming to moderate the target’s 
interests’ conceptions by shifting incentives and building networks of 
interdependence.48 Economic interdependence is able to operate as transforming agent 
that reshapes the goals of the latter. It can generate and establish vested interests in the 
context of target society and government undermining old values of military status 
and territorial acquisition. The beneficiaries of this interdependence become addicted 
to it and protect their interests by putting pressure on the government to accommodate 
the source of independence.49 Internationalist elites committed to economic openness 
and international stability might marginalize nationalist elites which are wedded to the 
threat or use of force. Regardless whether the society of targeted society constitutes a 
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pluralist democracy or not, interests tied to international economy become a critical 
part of the electorate to whom political elites must respond.50 
From the other side it could be said that economic interdependence operates 
also as a constraint on targeted state’s foreign policy behavior. A possible disruption 
in the developed economic relations between countries, due to tensions among the 
states, would be costly to the extent that the operating firms might lose assets that 
could not be readily redeployed elsewhere. Firms involved in bilateral economic 
exchange may get forced to search for next-best alternatives which might lead to 
important costs and losses for the economy.51   
 There are also other factors that might contribute to the formulation and the 
implementation of engagement strategy. The latter’s sufficiency depends also on the 
will of the targeted state to accept the influence deriving from this policy. In other 
words the engagement strategy presupposes that the target is not unalterably 
revisionist and in case it is not currently a state that serves the existing status quo it 
might become one. If the state supposes that the gains it has to draw from “accepting” 
the outcomes of this strategy can substantially replace the losses which might emerge 
in case it relinquishes its expansionist aspirations then the engagement pursuing 
policy is able to exert its influence. 
 Besides the interests’ calculation on behalf of a target state other factors might 
contribute to the formulation and implementation of the engagement strategy. 
Common geopolitical considerations are able to urge two initially rival states for 
cooperation and might make the adoption of engagement strategy on behalf of one of 
them seem a rational solution. A number of extra-regional issues in contiguous areas 
and a growing potential for instability in some areas might affect common threat 
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perceptions on the initially rival countries. Post-Communist developments that have 
emerged in the aftermath of  Yugoslavia’s and Soviet Union’s dissolution with the 
consequent modification of borders added more military threats and established many 
new states in their vicinity. Moreover, the security agenda of the hypothetically rivals 
has been widened in order to include difficulties of a cross-border and transnational 
nature with special reference to illegal immigration and trafficking, refugee flows, 
cross-border crime and environmental threats.52 All these make cooperation seem a 
useful solution in order to ensure their security. 
Another factor that might promote the formulation of interdependence 
relations is the involvement of a third party. Third party involvement can be identified 
with an actor that seeks to facilitate an agreement on any matter in the common 
interest of the parties involved. This party hypothetically aiming to stabilize peace in 
the region where both conflict states belong to pursues policies which aim to 
normalize their own bilateral relations. In the context of shaping regional diplomacy 
this party might undertake measures towards this direction. Intervention or 
operational prevention during crises whose escalation might bring the two parties into 
an armed conflict and putting pressure on both of them in order to reach agreements 
and an understanding that would engage them to peaceful and consensual settlement 
of their dispute(s), promote public debate and create incentives through trade and 
other activities constitute some of these measures. This way and under the label of 
“honest broker” third party involvement might function as inaugurating phase for 
further cooperation. 
The adoption of an engagement strategy might also be accommodated by 
unpredictable incidents. If a humanitarian disaster hits either one or both states some 
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opportunities can emerge in the context of which new thinking in foreign policy can 
take place. An incident which entails human costs, in the framework of public 
opinion, might challenge the importance of territorial dispute(s) in front of human 
tragedy. Both people from the one or the other side along with governments can 
participate at aid operations and mobilize NGO’s that aim to help the people from the 
other side indifferent if it has been considered so far as the “enemy”. This creates a 
“communication channel” among the people of both sides which with its turn is able 
to facilitate or accommodate the formulation of independent relations.53 
All these do not imply that a possible implementation of the strategy might not 
possess limitation(s) with respect either to its effectiveness or to its viability. The 
restriction relies on the fact that the pursued policy does not automatically entail that 
the target state will alter its existing positions or its revisionist aspirations as these are 
perceived by the pursuing state. The limitation that the initiating this policy country 
has to face is that the indicator or variable that might determine the success or the 
viability of the strategy rests on the good will of the supposed rival to cooperate or to 
become part of this strategy and not on the state that initiates this policy. In case the 
former remains incompliant regarding its initially formulated intentions and reluctant 
to cooperate it might interpret the pursued engagement strategy as sign of weakness or 
submissiveness on behalf of the initiating side. In this context it smolders a danger 
that this possible interpretation and point of view might make the supposedly holding 
revisionist aspirations state become more aggressive and increase its unilateral claims 
towards its neighbor. This means that the indicator that might define the effectiveness 
of the engagement strategy lies not on its successful implementation but on the 
reaction of the target state to it. 
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4. Europeanization and Engagement Strategy 
 
Europeanization, aligned with the way it has been approached in the previous 
chapter constitutes one of the most influential factors for a state in order to adopt an 
engagement strategy. The financial difficulties a government has to deal with in case 
it extracts an important part of its national budget for military purposes become more 
intensified in the case where the state is member of EC/EU and seeks to get more 
integrated in institutional, political and financial terms in the whole process. If a state 
seeks to join the European Monetary Union which constitutes the main core of EU it 
is obliged to align its fiscal policy with the need to fulfill some financial requirements, 
know as “convergence criteria”. The need to achieve a rate of inflation within 1.5% of 
the rates in the three participating countries with the lowest rates, to reduce its 
government deficits to below 3% of its gross national product and keep its currency 
exchange rates within some limits54 encumbers its ability to abstract part of its 
national budgets for the satisfaction of national defense concerns. Military 
expenditures, especially in dealing with a state with which a war is possible, entail 
increase of possible national budget deficit. This might lead to deviation from the 
before mentioned criteria. In this case a critical re-thinking of its priorities is 
inevitable. Can the employed containment strategy be harmonized with the needs of 
integrating into EU? This shows that Europeanization might function prohibitively for 
the embracement of containment. 
The dynamics of Europeanization are capable of affecting the policy and the 
strategy of an EU member-state towards the revisionist one by setting the following 
dilemma: from the one side does it want to become a deeply institutionalized member 
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of EU which will increase its strategic position in economic and political terms being 
fully integrated in the realities of the newly emerged globalized world? From the 
other side does it prefer to be marginalized from the European integration process 
while insisting on the adopted containment strategy with the consequent military 
expenditures that might cause its deviation from the whole process? In other words 
does this state want to remain committed to a strategy that might jeopardize its 
substance as EU member or should it proceed with the revision of its policy? In this 
case the transition from containment to engagement strategy seems able to satisfy the 
two concerns: it allows the alignment with the guidelines of European integration 
process and enables to focus on its security which is built on different theoretical 
fundamentals.    
Based on assumptions emanating from liberal institutionalism the 
Europeanization process can provide the disputing parts with some certain rules and 
laws that are supposed to be imbedded in the domestic environment and will 
contribute to the peaceful settlement of disputes between neighboring countries. EU 
aligned with its integration process and similar to German-French case is enabling 
reconciliation while providing the means for consolidating peaceful relations.55 
Europeanization through the channels of integration and association is able to change 
their policies vis-à-vis the other party toward conciliatory actions. One of the most 
important sources of influence at EU’s disposal to affect border conflicts is its 
capability to force the dispute parts into resolving their disputes either by promising to 
provide them with candidacy status or by threatening sanctions to this status. In the 
context of membership negotiations and by referring conditions that might enable 
these negotiations, EU insists on the adoption and implementation of its legal and 
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normative guidelines, the so called acquis communautaire, in the framework of which 
the peaceful resolution of border conflicts is also incorporated. If the conflict party 
intends to get entangled to EU road map and become an EU member it has to absorb 
the EU templates.56 
This constitutes the “EU carrot”. The initial hypothesis in this case 
presupposes the following assumption: the supposedly rival state which aims to enter 
EU has not internalized yet the logic of European unification both in domestic and 
foreign policy terms. Taking the role of Europeanization as an independent variable 
for granted, which are these indicators who would “operationalize” a possible 
transformation of the “aggressors” foreign policy? The arising involvement of public 
opinion, the establishment of institutional checks and balances and the domestication 
of norms and rules which have traditionally characterized EU are possible to lead to 
more rational (according to Western standards) and co-operative results. In the token 
of the democratic peace argument, an increasingly democratizing57 state is supposed 
to develop cooperative policies towards other democracies wherever they are located. 
The deriving assumption is that the more domestically closer to EU comes through a 
multidimensional process the more EU-oriented outcomes is going to generate and 
more compromising style is going to employ. The logic beyond that is relying on the 
possibility and the hope that increasing involvement of EU in domestic terms will 
entail the participation of various societal groups in the formulation of foreign policy 
leading with its turn to more cooperative policies towards other democracies with 
which they share common EU-based values.58 
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58 T. Oğuzlu, “The Impact of ‘Democratization in the Context of the EU Accession process’ on Turkish 
Foreign Policy” in Mediterranean Politics 9:1 (Spring 2004), p. 94--113 
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Democratization within the EU accession framework does not simply seek to 
establish democratic regimes in candidate states but also to integrate and domesticate 
the EU identity both in domestic and foreign policy terms. The identity of EU 
membership implies that candidate states should pursue policies (domestic and 
foreign) aligned with the character of EU. A possible successful implementation of 
the democratization in the context of EU road map might entail the initiation of EU-
oriented foreign policies.59  
 The emerging assumption is that in case the revisionist state internalizes the 
logic of Europeanization, as described in the previous chapter, it will gradually 
change the substance of its supposedly “revisionist” foreign policy. The case in which 
the supposedly “revisionist state” has the incentive to follow it does not imply that it 
has altered or renounced its views of the other party or its beliefs about the conflict. 
The possible change of its attitude will be of strategic importance in the sense that the 
compulsory impact deriving from the European dictates will lead it to deeper reforms 
through continued pressure and socialization. Its possibly gradual transformation will 
be reflected through the diagrams and reports coming from European Commission 
and Council of Ministers.60 This can probably make the foreign policy makers of the 
candidate state to restrain themselves from further escalating crises, and worked 
toward improving bilateral relations.61 
The EU member realizes that the Europeanization of the revisionist state can 
be seen as a recipe for sustained de-securitization. This means that in case the 
“revisionist state” becomes member of the EU the bilateral dispute(s) will lose their 
substance and meaning. The engagement strategy with special reference to integrating 
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the rival deeper into the European institutions rests upon the existence of an actor as 
EU which under its supranational identity can be regarded as reference point for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, with the imputed capabilities of inducing changes and 
reforms in other countries. Thus, it justifies its decision on behalf of the EU member 
to put all its efforts on bringing the rival into the EU.62 
5. Conclusions 
The question that can be obviously raised is whether Europeanization might 
remain effective to conflict resolution in case the target state seems either incapable or 
unwilling to harmonize itself with the “supposed Europeanized spirit” as this is 
described in the previous chapter and follows a course deviated from the European 
guidelines and dictates. In case the candidate state deals with a lot of obstacles during 
the implementation of its “European road map” and seems unable to fulfill its 
European aspirations how can EU with its existing mechanisms guarantee the 
effectiveness of the pursued engagement strategy? In a long run how can it ensure the 
protection and the security of the initiating engagement strategy state? The same 
question can be posed in case the majority of EU partners seem reluctant to accept the 
targeted state in their “family”. What is the alternative solution they can provide the 
initiating state with in order to contribute to a viable co-existence between the 
supposed rivals? 
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CHAPTER C: THE EUROPEANIZATION OF GREEK FOREIGN POLICY 
1. Introduction 
As described in a previous chapter the definition of Europeanization and 
especially the influence it exerts to the national foreign policies do not constitute an 
easy research task. The substance and the identity of national foreign policy as one of 
the last remaining domain reserves of sovereign governments in conjunction with the 
fact that it is subject to pressures emanating from both its domestic and international 
(or regional) environment provides the academic community with “theoretical 
obstacles” while dealing with the contribution of Europeanization on its formation. 
 The Europeanization itself as a process and generally the debate over the 
Europeanization in the context of Greek Foreign Policy had in advance to confront 
some endogenous and exogenous particularities of the Greek state which are ascribed 
into the following factors: 
? Maneuvering between East and West: the Greek nationalism is resulted from two 
“components” that initially seem to contradict each other-the heritage of classical 
ancient Greece (language parameter) from the one side and the respective one of 
the Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire (religion parameter) from the other. The 
former reflects the values on which to some extent the Enlightenment and 
extensively the Modern Western civilization has been founded. The latter 
provides the Greek culture with the principles deriving from the Eastern 
Orthodox dimension differentiating it from the other members of the Western 
world. It should be taken into account that the formulation of the Hellenic 
identity on the basis of these two components-principles took place in the 
framework of the Ottoman territory and period, a fact that had left also its marks 
to the whole self-orientation process. The question of belonging to the West or to 
the East, terminated, seemingly at least, in the aftermath of the Civil War in 
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Greece and its alignment with the Western Camp in the beginning of the Cold 
War.63 
? The turbulent region Greek state is surrounded from: Greece is located in the 
region which is known as “European powder magazine”, and which “produces 
more history than it consumes”. Although some of its members (Slovenia, 
Rumania and Bulgaria) are, institutionally at least, fully integrated into the 
European institutions Southeastern Europe still constitutes an area where the 
break-up of Yugoslavia generated renewed nationalisms, instability and civil 
wars.64 
? Political development pattern: the influential role of charismatic personalities or 
populist leaders, the important role of the state, the problematic existence of civil 
society and an economy mainly based on public sector reflect society elements 
that were following Greece even ten years after its accession in EC.   
All these parameters can not be left aside while proceeding with the description 
of the influence that Europeanization has exerted to the formulation and the outcome 
of the up to date Greek foreign policy. In the framework of this case and during the 
last decade a lot of writings have been published on behalf of the Greek academic 
community concerning the extent to which the impact of Europeanization on Greek 
Foreign Policy has become evident. 
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How could Europeanization in the Greek context be identified with? According 
to Economides the whole process rooted “in the impulse to join the EC, rather than 
stemming from the consequences of joining” has received the “form of 
Westernization, modernization, rehabilitation, denationalization and 
multirateralisation, to suit particular needs at particular times”.65 Ioakimidis states that 
due to Greece’s participation at EPC and its successive form CFSP its foreign policy 
has gradually obtained a “distinct European dimension and orientation” underlining 
that this fact should be located to a wider trend of “Greece’s political, economic, 
social and institutional status adjustment to the dictates of the Europeanization 
process”. He observes a progress towards Greece’s Foreign Policy Europeanization in 
different but interdependent to each other levels (European policy, foreign policy 
objectives, policy instruments and style, foreign policy making in terms of institutions 
and procedures).66  
Tsardanidis and Savvidis seek to use the “bottom up” and “top-down” approaches 
as theoretical tools- they were presented in the previous chapters- to explain the 
influence that Europeanization may have on Greek Foreign Policy. They attempted 
also to discriminate the meaning of Europeanization from other phenomena like 
modernization, democratization, westernization and globalization arguing that the 
whole procedure is a “rather superficial development which has only so far, and only 
partly, affected the elites in Greece”. They point out that although series of 
developments- that will be described below- have become evident in this context they 
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are useful but inadequate conditions in order to talk about a Europeanized Greek 
Foreign Policy.67 
Aim of this chapter, based on the literature that has been developed so far, is to 
present the “adventurous” evolution of the Europeanization process in the Greek 
context and its contribution to the gradual re-formulation of the Greek Foreign Policy 
from the day that Greece applied to become full membership in the EC until today.  
2. 1975-1981 The origins of Europeanization 
 A sort of Europeanization impact began to be more evident in the realities of 
the Greek foreign policy in 1975 when Greece applied to become full membership in 
the EC and touched mainly upon security considerations. The history of the 
relationship between the European Community and the Greek state does not begin in 
that year. In fact it was on 24th July of 1959 when it became the first non-member 
state that officially applied for Association with the wider perspective of a future 
membership. The Association Agreement was signed on 9th July of 1961 in Athens 
(registered as Athens agreement). Greece, as the southeastern pillar of NATO from 
1952 (along with Turkey) was supposed not to be concerned with vital external 
security issues except for the danger “emanating from the North”. The internal 
disorder of that period in combination with the involvement of exogenous factors 
resulted to the raise of dictatorship in power “inflicting a severe blow to the 
implementation of the Association Agreement”.68 
In the aftermath of Greece’s democracy restoration in 1975 the officials 
realized that they were obliged to re-orient their foreign policy considerations. The 
1974 Cyprus crisis in conjunction with the Turkish invasion and subsequent 
                                                 
67 Ch. Tsardanidis & St. Stavridis,  “The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy: A critical 
Appraisal” in Journal of European Integration 27:2, (2005) p. 217-239 
68 K. Botsiou, “Greece in the European Union: A Historical Account” in P. C Ioakimidis (ed.) Greece 
in the European Union: The New Role and the New Agenda, (Ministry of Press and Mass Media 
Athens 2002), p.20-21 
43 
occupation of the northern part of Cyprus created a field for “new thinking” in terms 
of security.69 The threat appeared not from the North anymore besides the rhetoric 
that was cultivated during the Cold War period, but the East70 and made a conflict 
between Turks and Greeks seem more possible than a respective one between one of 
them and one member of the Warsaw Treaty. The security issue concerning Greeks in 
the aftermath of the World War II under the NATO banner was put into question in 
1974, making them wonder whether it was worth paying dependence cost on NATO 
(with the consequent restriction of national security duties) without enjoying any 
advantages (security and protection). The participation at NATO was identified in the 
eyes both of Greek officials and the public opinion with an inadequate mechanism for 
the protection of their vital interests.71 Thus, the newly emerged C. Karamanlis 
government, realizing that NATO and especially Americans would underestimate the 
righteousness of their case in order to favor Turkey due to geopolitical considerations, 
and seeking to balance Greece’s relationship with the US and the EC, decided to 
apply for full membership in the European Community.72 After a diplomatic marathon 
that lasted more than four years Greece became a full member on 1st of January 1981. 
Besides the economic and political benefits that would derive from its identity 
as member state (consolidation of democracy and amelioration of the economy) EC 
was presented as the ground on which Greek Foreign Policy Makers could lay their 
security concerns. The Greek-Turkish dispute should not remain committed to a 
bilateral context according to their logic. The projection of Greek security interests 
should be “uploaded” onto the Community obtaining a more “Europeanized” or 
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“westernized” dimension.73 The “European path” was characterized by the Greek 
officials as the “safety valve” to protect and serve their national interests. 
 The transition of foreign policy issues from a national level to the respective 
multilateral or European constitutes a form of Europeanization, in the context of 
“bottom up” approach, as described in the previous chapters. Greece’s security, as a 
member, was supposed to affect directly EC’s security. The political support on 
behalf of EC appeared in the political scene as an attractive idea in an era during 
which the memories of Turkish invasion in Cyprus and Ankara’s demands over the 
Aegean were still fresh and as diplomatic weapon towards its eastern neighbor.74 This 
entire show that the origins of the Europeanization process of the Greek Foreign 
Policy are rooted in its incentive to “multilateralize” and “westernize” its security 
concerns.75 
3. 1981-1985 A deviation from Europeanization 
 
 In the context of the current thesis it was notified that identifying 
‘Europeanization’ with the main variable that contributes to the formulation of foreign 
policy at national level runs the risk of overestimating its impact if the importance of 
other endogenous (domestic) or exogenous (international) influences is not counted 
in. Its applicability and the evidence of its influence rest also upon the eagerness of 
the domestic environment to accept and adopt the elements it is composed of. 
This was not the case for Greece during the first four years after its accession 
to EC. Although New Democracy, and personally C. Karamanlis had prepared the 
“implementation field” of the whole procedure seeking effectively to integrate Greece 
                                                 
73  Ibid. p. 473 
74 Y. Valinakis,  Introduction to the Greek Foreign Policy 1949-1988, (Athens Sideris 2005), p. 275 
75 S. Economides (2005), p. 475 
45 
in the EC as a full member the raise of PA.SO.K76 in power seems to formulate a 
different scene for Greece’s foreign policy orientations and plans. Greece seems 
initially to “sheer away from the Europeanization direction” that had sought to draw.  
At the October 1981 national elections PASOK won a landslide victory with 48% of 
the vote, and capturing 173 seats; it formed the first socialist government in the 
history of Greece since 1924. It was founded in 1974 as a radical Marxist-inspired 
party that called for the dissolution of the country's military alliances and for tighter 
government regulation of the economy. Its founding declaration was including the 
following guidelines as its mottos: "National Independence, Popular Sovereignty, 
Social Emancipation and Democratic Process".77 
As Economides points out its coming to power under the (objectively 
influential) leadership of Andreas Papandreou “shook Greece’s membership of the 
West, and hence of the EC, to its very foundations”.78 “Greece belongs to the Greeks” 
(in contrast to Karamanlis’ motto that “Greece belongs to the West”) and “EC and 
NATO are the same syndicate” were the two slogans that illustrated fundamental 
positions of its party and its initial intentions towards the two institutions. It 
considered EC as the tool of “the Western capital” to impose its power to the less 
financially developed states and social classes. 
Andreas Papandreou was opposing the whole concept of Greece’s accession to 
EC because he was afraid that Greece would increase its dependence on the Western 
powers and reduce its capabilities to undertake an autonomous international role.79 
Another reason for his opposition was the fact that the management of the economy 
would be subject to Brussels’ observation and control, and that the Greek industries 
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would face huge obstacles in order to get adapted to the dictates of the new 
competitive environment. Being aware of the traditional structural problems and 
dysfunctions the after-war state “was born with” and the stagflation it had to confront 
in the aftermath of the two energy crises in 1970’s he realized that it would run the 
risk of inadaptability in the EC requirements. Thus, before the 1981 elections he 
raised the question whether Greece should remain in the EC or not, promising that he 
would proceed with a referendum concerning that issue. In the aftermath of these 
elections he did not fulfil this promise but he sought to implement an expansively 
populist agenda aiming at “income redistribution”. This resulted to the initial 
improvement of the social and financial status of the average household from the one 
side, and to a dramatic growth of public deficit, national debt and inflation and to an 
important deviation from the EC “economic templates” and macroeconomic figures of 
the other nine (until then) member-states from the other.80 In 1982 the Greek 
delegation wrote and submitted to EC a Memorandum which emphasized Greece's 
peculiarities and its consequent need for financial support from the Community and 
for temporary exemption from EU rules. Following the Commission's reservations on 
the latter, PASOK's main objective centered on the redistribution of Community 
financial resources to enable Greece and other less developed countries in the EU to 
make the necessary adjustments, thereby strengthening the Community's cohesion.81  
. The Europeanization process in Greece did not have to deal only with these 
hurdles. The intense nationalistic language and the anti-Western rhetoric PASOK 
employed harboured doubts regarding Greece’s honest attitude as member of the 
Western world. Papandreou, forged links with many leaders of the Arab world and 
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played the lead with Ulf Palme in the Initiative of Six. Exploiting the anti-American 
reflexes of the Greek society during that period he cultivated a rhetoric which was 
demanding the direct withdrawal of the American bases from the Greek ground. To a 
little extent his rhetoric was effective.82 Greek officials viewed with scepticism EC 
further political integration. Thus, they showed clearly their preference to the 
amplification of the intergovernmental nature of the processes that were “composing” 
EPC towards which in general they kept initially a suspicious and cautious stance.83 
This behaviour was lying on the following factors: 
? PA.SO.K’s constancy of undertaking an autonomous international role.84 The 
rationale beyond this position was touching upon the need to respond to the 
internal pressure emanating from its own supporters and its leadership that was 
favoring an independent Greek Foreign Policy and to inactivate every possible 
“mechanism” with the help of which the “Big Powers”85 would impose their 
opinions in reference to issues that might include a political cost for Athens 
(Cyprus problem and dispute with Turkey)86 
? the perception that interposing veto constituted an inalienable right that could be 
exercised without restrictions and without any repercussions on the positions that 
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the other partners would take towards vital as they were perceived Greek national 
interests87  
Greek diplomacy was considered the “thorn” for the formulation of a common 
EC stance towards many external issues and especially in the Generally Assembly of 
the UN. The refusal to condemn the imposition of martial law in Poland and the 
downing of Korean Lines Aircraft are some of the examples that reflect these 
regarded by its partners “uncooperative policies”.88 Greece sought to exploit every 
“weighty law power” emanating from its participation at EPC in order to get into a 
“bombardment” of Turkey “pointing its finger” to the latter’s claims over the Aegean 
and Cyprus. The intention was to set the bilateral issues on the “Community’s table” 
and “incorporate” them in the wider context of the EC-Turkish relations. Thus, it 
sought several times to interrupt the financial cooperation between EC and Turkey 
taking advantage of exercising the veto-right.89 Its policy caused its further 
marginalization in the EPC framework but either intentionally or not it might “had 
disencumbered” other EC partners that perhaps did not want to cooperate with Turkey 
(due to internal pressure from public opinion that was opposing the immigration of 
Turkish workers in the European ground) and were “hiding themselves” behind the 
dogmatic Greek stance. 
All these show that the dynamics of Europeanization had not imbedded in the 
realities of Greek Foreign Policy. Although Greeks, belonging to the European 
family, were able to enmesh their own security concerns to an EC context this did not 
imply that they were influenced by the dynamics of Europeanization. Holding fixed 
positions in many cases, entangled solely on its national interests, reluctant to 
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communicate or to consulate along with its EC partners and pursuing consensus-
breaking policies mirror political choices which are supposedly deviating from the 
Europeanization dynamic, as this is described in Chapter A. The positive response of 
EC in 1985 to the Greek Memorandum of 1982 will dramatically contribute to a shift 
of Greece’s positions towards European Integration and the consequent re-alignment 
of Greek Foreign Policy to the Europeanization process. 
4. 1985-1996 The sources of re-adjustment to the Europeanization process 
 
During this period there appears to be a different trend towards the 
Europeanization process. A degree of “harmonization and adaptation” can be noted 
since the dynamics of European integration get “incorporated” in the Greek realities90. 
The evolution of Europeanization process question is not coming suddenly into the 
surface for the Greek case but goes beyond European integration.91 The evidence of 
its impact on the Greek Foreign Policy should be ascribed into developments that will 
be mentioned below. 
The perspective of the Single Act and the establishment of a common market 
until 1992 among the member states underlined the need for greater economic and 
social cohesion among the diverse countries and regions of the Community. In this 
context the intentions of the EC officials for further integration were reflected by the 
partially positive response to the Greek Memorandum through the establishment of 
Structural Funds, with special reference to European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and 
European Social Fund (ESF).92 The vast transfer of funds both from structural 
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programs and the CAP contributed immensely to making the wider Greek public 
enthusiastically supportive of European integration.93 
PASOK's reelection in 1985 inaugurated a process that led to the “curtailment 
of both its socialist inclinations and its nationalist overtones”.94 Gerasimos Arsenis, 
then the minister of national economy and a supporter of ethnocentric solutions, was 
immediately replaced by Kostas Simitis, a strongly pro-EU politician. The austerity 
program that was then introduced reflected not only Greek economic necessity but 
also the imperative need for further integration and alignment with the Community's 
market economy rules. This European orientation of the PASOK government 
obtained a more official dimension with the acceptance of the SEA in 1986 and 
Maastricht Treaty with the identity of the opposing party in 1992.95 
The EMU project which emerged from the TEU and the perspective for the new 
enlargement of the EU functioned also as a catalyst to Greece’s further 
Europeanization process. From the one side the marginalization danger and the risk 
that the Greek state would run in economic, political and institutional terms inside the 
EU in case it resisted the need to adjust its economy, society and policy to the EMU 
“dictates” worked as a “driving force” for the whole procedure. From the other side 
the fact that all Eastern Europe countries, indeed all countries surrounding Greece 
aimed to access the EU, illustrated the importance of Greek membership and 
underlined the imperative need for Greece to become more deeply integrated and a 
more active player in the EU context.96 The fear of isolation in strategic terms and the 
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need for adaptation to the newly emerged challenges contributed to the understanding 
of Greece’s harmonization and alignment need with its EU members.  
The end of Communism reflected by the dissolution of Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia eliminated every theoretical oscillation possibility between West and East 
and made PASOK’s initial claims regarding the need to take over international 
autonomous roles seem unrealistic declarations. The region from which Greece is 
surrounded, keeping its reputation as “turbulent”, became a field for the emergence of 
new nationalisms and conflicts.97 Greece seemed unable to undertake alone the 
responsibilities for the reconstruction of the whole area. Consequently, the EU 
emerges in the eyes of the officials as the institutional framework within which they 
could promote the stability and their interests in the region. Their expectations were 
not directly fulfilled. From the one side the CFSP that was established with the 
Maastricht Treaty did not manage to ensure the peace in the region, paying the cost of 
the internal contradictory interests among its member-states in the area. From the 
other side Greece was paying according to its EU partners exaggerating attention on 
the FYROM question. An issue that was supposed to be conducted in “tactic and 
diplomatic manner” because its particularity was insolubly linked to the wider Balkan 
problem entered different “channels” in the context of which it seemed that the 
manipulation of the public opinion and the determination of political gains would 
prevail the service of the national interests. The blockade that Greece imposed on 
FYROM goods moving to and from the port of Thessaloniki with the exception of 
humanitarian aid on 16th February of 1994, exploiting the advantages deriving from 
its identity as President of the European Council, was criticized by certain partners as 
an action opposing the Europeanization of its national Foreign Policy. From the other 
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side the Greek delegation accused its EU partners of handling this issue without 
taking into account the revisionist nationalistic inclinations behind FYROM’s 
policy.98   
Leaving aside the FYROM case due to its peculiarities, Greek Foreign Policy 
becomes more subject to the Europeanization process. The fact that the opinions of 
two big parties (New Democracy and PA.SO.K) are politically identified with the 
support of further European integration and Greece’s increasing participation at it 
constitutes an important feature for the Europeanization procedure to accelerate its 
influence. Despite this progress, it should be noted that the handling of its key foreign 
policy issues (Cyprus, Turkey, FYROM), remains under the “sovereign umbrella” 
showing that Europeanization has not reached the point where it can influence the 
treatment of Greece’s vital interests. 
5. 1996-Today The acceleration of the Europeanization process 
 If Papandreou’s policies during 80s leaded to a restraining impact of 
Europeanization on Greek Foreign Policy, it could be easily claimed that this was not 
the case with Simitis’ policies in ‘90s. The transformation of the domestic 
environment towards this procedure relied mainly on the before mentioned external 
developments. The acceleration of the Europeanization impact on Greece in terms of 
domestic and foreign policy relies on an evolution in the Greek political system. 
The election of Costas Simitis and his installation as a Prime Minister in 1996 
constituted a major turning point in Greek politics regarding the increasing influence 
that Europeanization could expose on them. His rise to power initiated a series of 
developments that had been underway long before. Simitis symbolizes European 
                                                 
98 D. Floudas,  “Pardon? A conflict for a name? FYROM’s dispute  with Greece revisited” 
http://www.intersticeconsulting.com/documents/FYROM.pdf 
 
53 
normalcy as opposed to Greek “exceptionalism”.99 At a personal level Simitis seemed 
to be a quiet and reserved character. As party leader he never matched the dominance 
of Andreas Papandreou and his charismatic style. The leadership was consciously 
shifted to be more managerial and technocratic. The Simitis’ explicit project was to 
secure Greece’s position at the core of the EU.100 
George Papandreou’s emergence as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1999 
played also a decisive role to keep Greek Foreign Policy committed to its 
Europeanizing direction. The Kosovo crisis in 1999 and NATO intervention 
cultivated an anti-Western climate on behalf of the Greek public opinion. Greek 
people due to the feelings of sympathy they were fostering towards Serbia did not 
want any Greek involvement in these NATO operations. Papandreou following a 
policy of “constructive ambiguity” managed to inactivate the anti-Western reflexes of 
Greek people101 by not cooperating militarily in these operations from the one side 
and to grant NATO forces the rights of passage through Greek territory from the 
other.102 His intervention was of determinant importance in order to keep Greek 
Foreign Policy aligned to its Europeanizing orientation. 
In a similar framework another development in the Greek society has been the 
emergence of a small constituency of scholars, journalists and political activists who 
are supposed to resist the danger of “national mythologizing”. This group which was 
strongly supporting Simitis’ policies is small but influential enough to undertake a 
variety of projects from critically reviewing Greek primary and secondary schooling 
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aiming at a more open and friendly approach to neighbors to a number of conferences, 
publications and articles.103 
The positive contribution to these developments on behalf of the main 
opposing party during that period, New Democracy should not be underestimated. 
Firmly committed to its pro-European profile it supported the foreign policy choices 
of Simitis and Papandreou.104 New Democracy, after coming into power in 2004, 
seems to remain attached to the continuation of Greece’s Europeanization process 
both in domestic and in foreign policy terms. Without the convergence among the two 
big parties concerning Greece’s European future and the strategy on the basis of 
which the national interests could be effectively served several doubts could be 
harbored regarding the viability of the whole procedure. 
Greece’s participation at CFSP forced Greek foreign policy to embrace new 
policy instruments and a new policy style more congruent with EU requirements.105 
Greek Foreign Policy is beginning to ‘absorb’ the logic of European unification with 
great success. Any international issue is immediately seen and treated under the angle 
of EU, keeping into account the views of all the other member states.106 The impact of 
EU membership and the participation at CFSP have underlined “the increasingly 
pivotal role of multilateral organizations, other than UN, the ineffectiveness of veto 
and consensus-breaking policy, the importance of building alliances and advancing 
foreign policy objectives”. It illustrated the importance of negotiation and 
compromise as fundamental instruments for resolving problems and promoting 
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interests in the context of the modern and interdependent world.107 The traditional line 
of the Greek Foreign Policy was trapped by an extreme realism that was equating 
every non realistic analysis with utopian-idealistic and confessedly approaches and 
negotiations with an act leading inevitably to unacceptable surrender.108 As Keridis 
points out this policy line gave its way to a renewed Greek foreign policy that 
includes realism, flexibility, positive energy instead of rejection and maximalism, 
undertaking initiatives instead of having a passive role, planning and prevention 
instead of extemporization and simplified reactions towards events determined by 
others.109 
This impact seems to be also through the shift from an intense nationalistic 
horology reflected by phrases like “national rights” and “national issues” to the 
language of interests and national pursuits not exposed to any sort of questioning.110 
As Ioakimidis supports this change is accompanied by a wider attempt to redefine 
patriotism not merely as a constant drive to fulfill narrowly conceived nationalistic 
objectives in foreign policy (which have mainly to deal with the evolution of the 
Turkish-Greek relations) but as multi-faced situation leading to a “stronger Greece, 
not merely in military terms but primarily in economic, political, institutional and 
cultural resources, a Greece fully integrated into the European Union”.111     
The identity as EU membership has contributed to Greece’s acquiring a strong 
economic dimension in the formulation of foreign policy and more generally elements 
of “low politics” or “soft power”. The participation at CFSP has affected Greek 
foreign policy agenda to embrace issues such as trade, environment, technology, 
culture and agriculture and contribution of NGOs on policy formulation. The 
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development of “economic diplomacy” with special reference to the Balkans region 
belongs to the context of the “top-down” influence that Europeanization exerts to 
Greek Foreign Policy. Greece in the Balkans seeks for the formulation of a 
multilateralist foreign policy (with EU partners) designed to establish successful 
transition policies toward democracy and market economy in almost every state in its 
northern borders.112 In the words of G. Papandreou, Greek state is aware of the fact 
that “the Balkanization of the region must be replaced by a coordination of 
international efforts. The heart of the European ethos lies in building institutions and 
practices of inclusiveness. That is why Greece has always supported EU enlargement 
as a means of building a bridge of security, cooperation and development between 
nations”.113 To this direction Greek officials prepared the ground for stronger bilateral 
relations by signing more than 30 economic agreements covering many aspects of 
economic activities. Nearly 3,000 Greek enterprises and businesses have seized the 
chance and taken advantage of this newly emerging environment and are now actively 
conducting operations in these markets. The employment of a diplomacy with evident 
economic elements aims at a permanent peace in the region.114 
Having undertaken certain obligations under the label of the EU member state 
Greece founded Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans 
(HiPERB) which constitutes an effort on the behalf of Greece to “incorporate certain 
individual initiatives of development assistance into one single plan, and thus promote 
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an integrated development policy”. The ultimate goal is the political, economic and 
social stability in Southeast Europe.115 
The ultimate manifestation of Europeanization’s impact on Greek Foreign 
Policy is the “multilateralisation” and “denationalization”116 of the national interests’ 
handling. In the aftermath of Simitis election Greece had to confront an escalated 
crisis with Turkey which brought the two countries into the “brink of a conflict”. This 
was averted following the American mediation and involvement. CFSP similarly to 
the Balkans’ issue seemed unable to take the initiatives that would implicate in the 
peaceful resolution of 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis. Although someone could wonder 
whether the participation at CFSP was effective and substantial for the national 
interests Simitis remained attached to the European orientation he had in mind for 
Greece. He showed the first signs of the new Greek attitude to its national interests 
“embarking on concerted, and well orchestrated, diplomatic campaign” seeking to 
convince its EU partners that the Greek borders were actually EU’s borders and that 
revisionist according to the Greek claims Turkish policy in the Aegean should 
motivate EU to defend itself for the “Greek-European” borders. This lobbying in the 
EU context reflected a transformation regarding the way Greece would conceptualize 
and handle its key foreign policy issues. The vital national issues as perceived by the 
Greek side were projected-“uploaded” onto the EU instruments and exposed to a kind 
of “denationalization and multi-lateralization” bearing in mind the bottom-up 
approach of Europeanization that was theoretically discussed in a previous chapter.117 
The perception that key foreign policy issues should not monolithically touch upon 
national sovereignty but also conducted through the “European channel”constitutes 
the most characteristic mark that Europeanization has left on Greek Foreign Policy. 
                                                 
115 HiPERB http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Economic+Diplomacy/HiPERB/ 
116 S. Economides (2005), p. 481-482 
117 Ibid. 
58 
In a short space of time and as a consequence of the before mentioned 
evolutions and developments Greece managed to Europeanize gradually its vital 
foreign interest in the most practical of terms through both the style and substance of 
its new foreign policy. The top-down and bottom-up impact that Europeanization had 
on the formulation of Greek foreign policy was not restricted only towards its 
northern neighbors. As it will be described in the next chapter, Greece is seeking to 
implement a policy towards Turkey that includes all the aforementioned elements. 
The desire to integrate Turkey deeper into the western institutions and to develop 
economic ties within this framework under the “engagement strategy” label constitute 
a deviation of the traditional line of the Greek Foreign policy (or containment 
strategy) which had been adopted so far and aimed to keep Turkey marginalized and 
isolated from EU. A policy fully aligned with its EU partners seeking to bring Turkey 
closer to the ‘European dream’ with the help of building firm economic relations with 
it reveal the “indelible marks” of the Europeanization process on the Greek Foreign 
Policy. 
6. Conclusions 
It seems clear that the Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy has made 
progressive steps. The main obstacle is that its viability rests upon one possible 
evolution that will not derive from the Greece’s “Europeanized policy choices”. The 
evolution of the further Europeanization process lies on the question whether Turkey 
seizes the chance and intensifies its efforts to become a credible part of the European 
world or not. If Turkey decides that the European orientation does not constitute its 
main political aim and becomes “unhooked” from the EU’s dictates, what will be the 
future of Greek Foreign Policy in Europeanization terms? It is obvious now that 
Greece is seeking to exploit every advantage is stemming out from its identity as EU 
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member in order to push Turkey become more integrated into the EU. If Turkey does 
not “win the European bet” and returns to an unpredictable for the European given 
policy, how can Greece being its western neighbor rely on the fact that the 
Europeanization process will automatically resolve the disputes? This proves again 
the “vulnerability” of Europeanization to pressures and influences emanating from 
both the domestic and international environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
CHAPTER D: FROM CONTAINMENT TO ENGAGEMENT 
THE ROLE OF EUROPEANIZATION 
1. Introduction 
The perception of a threat from Turkey has traditionally dominated Greek 
thinking about the strategic environment, including defense planning. For many years 
Turks were regarded as the danger emanating from the East, the age-old enemy and 
impudent to attack and damage Greece’s integrity. Many Greek commentators stated 
that Greeks should be always on the alert in order to head off every possible “Turkish 
threat and aggressiveness”. This point of view had been theoretically deeply rooted in 
the Greek national consciousness. It should not be underestimated that in broader 
political terms, conflict with Ottoman and modern Turkey is supposed to be central to 
the development of Greek nationalism and the evolution of the modern state. 
The content the current chapter is concerned with will focus on the strategy 
which Greeks adopted in order to deal with their Eastern neighbor. For many years a 
containment policy (whose conceptual framework is analyzed in chapter B) had been 
pursued. After 1999 Greeks, under the influence of Europeanization dynamics which 
started to become evident after 1996, altered their strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. Which 
was the underlying factor that contributed to this transition? How was the renewed 
strategy implemented and pursued in the Greek Foreign Policy realm? These are the 
questions the chapter is seeking to answer. 
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2. The rationale behind the adoption of Containment Strategy towards Turkey 
From the majority of Greek Foreign Policy Makers’ point of view since the 
Cyprus crisis of 1974, the potential for a major clash between Greece and Turkey had 
become important for the security equation in southeastern Europe and the eastern 
Mediterranean, albeit overshadowed for decades by the East-West competition.118 The 
Turkish invasion-the term is used in UN resolutions119-and the subsequent occupation 
of the northern part of Cyprus seemed to pave the way for “new thinking” in terms of 
security.120 The sense of threat felt by Greece from the North, as the Cold-War 
conditions had imposed, had started to dissolve according to the Greek perceptions. 
This new thinking was not triggered off only by the Cyprus events but also by the 
Turkish aspirations in the Aegean which are hold as revisionist from the Greek point 
of view and are supposed to be systematically spread to every direction consolidating 
the Greek perception that Turkey has set out in an effort of total revision of the 
international status quo of the Aegean and the relating regulations of the past.121 
Turkish consistent and unilateral claims since 1974-75 over the delimitation of 
the maritime boundaries and continental shelf, the breadth of territorial waters, the 
control of the airspace and Greek “militarization” of eastern Aegean Islands reflect, 
according to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey’s “revisionist aspirations” 
in the Aegean. In the context of holding Turkey as revisionist power in the Aegean the 
commentators include violations of the Greek airspace, refusal to submit the 
delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf to the International Court of Justice, 
threats of war in case Greece implements its right to extend its territorial zone from 
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six to twelve miles (according to the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea) and challenges of the Aegean status quo as established by a number 
of international treaties (1923 Lausanne Treaty, 1932 Agreement between Italy and 
Turkey, 1947 Paris Treaty). These perceived challenges are reflected by Turkish 
unilateral claims for the existence of “grey-zones” in the Aegean. According to what 
the Turkish side supports, small islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean whose status 
has not been clarified by the aforementioned treaties are subject to sort of questioning 
relating to where they belong to.122 It should be reminded that this led to the 
Imia/Kardak crisis in January 1996123 which brought the contributing parts into the 
brink of an armed conflict.  
Turkey claims that the extension by Greece of her territorial waters beyond the 
present 6 miles in the Aegean will have most inequitable implications and would 
constitute an abuse of right. Turkey has repeatedly threatened that such an act would 
be considered a casus belli. According to them the whole issue represents an age-old 
attempt by Greece to turn the Aegean into a “Greek lake”.124 They point to the fact 
that if a 12 mile limit is implemented, then virtually all passage to high seas from 
Turkish Aegean and Black Sea ports would be through areas under Greek sovereignty 
and jurisdiction. Under the present 6-mile limit, Greece holds approximately 43.5% of 
the Aegean Sea and Turkey 7.7%, the remaining 49% being high seas. If the 12-mile 
limit be applied, the Greek territorial waters in the Aegean will increase to 71.5% 
whereas Turkey’s share will increase to 8.7%, and the area of high seas will be 
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reduced to 19.7% which will be also fragmented due to the existence of the Greek 
islands.125   
Greece on its part considers that according to international law, both 
customary and contractual, she is entitled to extend her territorial waters to up to 12 
nautical miles. One of her additional arguments relies upon the fact that this right has 
already been exercised by many states including Turkey, which since 1964 has 
extended her territorial waters in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean to 12 nautical 
miles, albeit not being contributing part to the UN Convention on the Law of Sea.126 
Greece also has a coastal zone of 10 nautical miles serving aviation and air policing 
requirements as established by Presidential Decree 6/18, of September 1931 on the 
determination of the extent of territorial waters for aviation and air policing 
requirements.127  
Turkey’s dispute over the breadth of Greek airspace began in 1975-although, 
as the Greek officials claim, she had, for 44 years (1931-1975), recognized and 
respected the above rule of 10 nautical miles. Turkish officials since then do not 
recognize the ten-mile Greek air-limit refusing also to submit flight plans when their 
military aircraft enter the Athens FIR region.128 According to the Greek Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs the frequency of violations of Greek airspace by Turkish military 
aircraft (frequently over flying Greek islands) has considerably increased in the last 
few years and the tendency to engage in mock dogfights increases the probability of a 
real air engagement with possible escalatory effects. 
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As to the Moslem minority in Greek Thrace, according to elements deriving 
from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it consists of 49.9% Turks, 33.6% 
Pomaks and 16.5% Gypsies.129 Occasional threats according to the Greek 
commentators-in certain extremist quarters- advocate for Turkish intervention in 
Thrace aiming to liberate their “oppressed kin”. In this context, the role of the Turkish 
Consulate General in Komotini is continuously criticized by the Greek mass media for 
instigating nationalistic irredentism among the Muslim communities of the region. 
Hence, there is Greek concern, that under certain circumstances, Turkish territorial 
aspirations vis-à-vis Greek Thrace130 might become in the future the most important 
challenge to Greek security.131 
According to Greek analysts Turkey’s revisionist aims towards Greece have 
come out and are continuously manifested-even today-through official statements, 
diplomatic initiatives and military actions (including the deployment of its armed 
forces). As Platias points out, Turkish official declarations have been intensifying 
Greek fears. In the same token the Turkish Prime Minister’s Demirel stated in 1975 
that “…half of the Aegean is ours. Let the whole world know that this is so… We 
know how to crush the heads of our enemies when the prestige, dignity and interests 
of the Turkish nation are attacked”.132 Moreover, direct challenges as interpreted by 
the Greek officials (e.g. “the group of islands that are situated within 50 km of the 
Turkish coast…should belong to Turkey”), as well as indirect questioning of Greek 
sovereignty over the Aegean islands have been viewed with great alarm.  
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 Greece, in order to deal with the perceived Turkish threat came up with the 
decision to adopt a containment strategy towards Turkey reflecting the Cold-War 
situation and the zero-sum perception that were shaping their bilateral relations. The 
establishment of national forces out of the NATO context and exposed to the control 
by national administration constituted one of Greece’s containment pillars. The 
rationale beyond this was that though paying dependence cost on NATO (with the 
consequent restriction of national security duties) they were not supposed to enjoy any 
advantages (security and protection) they should stem out from their participation at 
the alliance.133 For more than twenty years, Greece, on average, allocated 
approximately (and maybe more than) 6% of GDP to defense compared with a NATO 
average of 3.8% for the same period.134 
The other pillar on which the pursued policy had been constructed was 
concentrating on how to avoid an increase in Turkey’s political, economic and 
diplomatic power relative and leverage comparing to that of Greece. This would 
include efforts to slow down the development of Turkey’s relations with the EU 
whose member was already Greece, thus limiting its expansion of influence. 
Containment assumes that allowing Turkey to strengthen its relations with Europe 
will not lead to its behavior change, but rather it will embolden its leadership, making 
an eventual clash with Turkey even more likely. This is the reason why even modest 
progress of EC/EU-Turkish relations should be resisted in the Greek perception. 
Under the umbrella of containment strategy all elements of EU-Turkish relations 
would be subordinate to the aim of preventing Turkey’s European (and international) 
standing. This kind of policy assumes that the impasse in Turkish-Greek relations will 
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remain because given its political tradition of Kemalist nationalism, Turkey is 
unlikely to let its policy become more conciliatory, since it would have to respond to 
the nationalist passions of a large part of both its elites and populace. Taking all these 
for granted, the Greek state should both demonstrate its resolve to deter Turkey and 
take steps to get prepared for a conflict.135 
3. The rationale of Europeanization behind the adoption of Greece’s Engagement 
Strategy 
Imia-Kardak crisis could be perceived as the zenith of the Greek-Turkish 
tensions since it brought, as it was said before, the two countries into the brink of an 
armed conflict. This incident could be regarded as the point where the first motives 
were created towards a rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations. It generated strong 
pressure from the United States and the European Union, on both countries 
(especially on Athens), to reach an understanding and compelled Simitis' government 
to abandon Greece's long-held policy of 'no talks with Turkey.136' Besides the 
incidents that followed this crisis (S-300 missiles and Ocalan case), a “wind of 
change” improved the atmosphere in the Greek-Turkish relations and contributed to 
the gradual adoption of an engagement strategy on behalf of the Greeks towards 
Turkey. 
Many people either subconsciously or not have associated the employment of 
this strategy with some other important incidents that had taken place during 1999, 
mainly the Kosovo crisis and the earthquakes in both countries. It is a fact that the 
Kosovo crisis had a crucial influence in pushing the officials of both states toward 
regional cooperation and clearly marked a shifting from traditional patterns of foreign 
policy. NATO's Kosovo operation had a strategic impact on Greek-Turkish relations, 
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providing the two countries with a common goal, which consists of the stability in 
NATO’s southeastern flank.137 It became clear that a possible conflict would endanger 
stability in Southeastern Europe and complicate further the settlement of disputes in 
the Balkans.138 In the words of G. Papandreou, “the harrowing war in Kosovo brought 
home to the Greek people the importance and necessity of good, neighborly 
relations… Greece has made an effort to take the lead in promoting stability, 
cooperation, and democracy in the Balkans. Given this basic, but determined, foreign 
policy outlook, it would have been incongruous to exclude Turkey”.139 
In August and September 1999 successive devastating earthquakes hit the two 
countries. The so called "earthquake or seismic diplomacy" initiated by the peoples 
generated an outpouring of sympathy and generous assistance provided by ordinary 
Greeks and Turks in both cases. These acts were encouraged from the top and took 
many foreigners by surprise, preparing the public for a breakthrough in the climate of 
bilateral relations, which had been marred by decades of hostility over pogroms, 
territorial disputes and the situation in the divided island of Cyprus.140 This process 
included not only a public legitimization of a new policy course but also a process of 
“demystifying the enemy”.141 It is worth mentioning that it was the first time since the 
public neighborliness that every side showed for the others’ trauma inaugurating a 
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new “communication channel” among the people, something unusual for the bilateral 
relations’ standards.142 
Although these events contributed to the implementation-acceleration of the 
whole engagement strategy process the dynamics of European integration and 
Europeanization could be regarded as the main driving force behind the adoption of 
the rationale of this strategy. It is assumed in the framework of this chapter that 
Europeanization functioned as the main variable or indicator that could contribute to 
the “operationalization” of the whole engagement strategy adoption. In the context of 
the previous chapter it was referred that every government since 1975, the year during 
which Greece applied for full membership to the European Community, sought to 
“up-load” and project the Greek-Turkish dispute onto a European level. The logic was 
that utilizing every possible advantage deriving from Greece’s participation at these 
institutions in contrast to Turkey would motivate EC to employ a similar to Greeks’ 
stance towards its neighbor and hindering the materialization of Ankara’s revisionist 
policy as it was perceived by Greeks. These expectations were not fulfilled to the 
degree Greek officials had imagined or expected. Against their will they found 
themselves many times marginalized and isolated from the majority of their European 
partners. One obvious example constitutes the before described crisis which was 
averted following mainly US’ prompt mediation. 
Simitis’ policies, entangled to Greece’s “European guidelines”, made several 
attempts to convince its EU partners143 that Greece’s borders were supposedly 
identified with the respective EU borders’ signaling a kind of “denationalization and 
multilateralisation” of Greece’s handling of national interests. This fact was 
consequently revealing the inaugurating and evident impact of Europeanization on the 
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formulation of Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey. This does not mean that the 
whole strategy was resting upon EU partners’ eagerness to defend the Greek borders. 
Greece was obliged to devote an important part of its national budget for security 
concerns’ ‘channel’.144 
Simitis’ government had to deal with two main challenges: from the one side 
it had to follow Turkish arms’ race committing itself to financial expenses in order to 
amplify Greece’s deterrence capabilities145 and from the other it was committed to 
secure its position at the core of the EU which in institutional, economic and political 
terms was reflected by the positive response to the EMU challenge. Between 1996 
and 2000, Greece spent $14 billion in revamping its military equipment whereas 
Turkey declared a $150 billion military spending program for 30 years period 
beginning in 1996. It should be noted also that military spending in Greece increased 
by 30 percent between 1989 and 1999.146 It seemed that the whole armament 
competition did not affect Turkey the same way it affected Greece, since the former 
as a non EU member did not have to deal with the imperative need to satisfy the EMU 
requirements. It became also clear that this armament competition against Turkey in 
quantity terms would lead Greece to an impasse situation. According to analysts these 
armament programs would exert a negative influence on the Greek economy with 
special reference to what is called “the steam engine of financial development”, the 
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investment expenditure as a share of GDP.147 The national deficit emanating from 
these expenses would jeopardize Greece’s “road map” to the EU core. The policies of 
Simitis government, to an important extent influenced by the military budget, resulted 
in the initial exclusion of Greece from EMU that year. Greece was supposed not to 
belong to the 11 member states that would introduce the new Euro currency in 
2002.148 
PASOK was exposed to an imperative need of raising Greece to the level of 
material prosperity enjoyed by its EU partners. A fully integrated to the EU member 
would emerge as “core European actor” in the framework of a globalized economy 
and avoid the repercussions of remaining peripheral and isolated from its EU 
partners.149 The Greek think tanks of that period realized that the “actual strategic bet” 
that would strengthen Greece’s position should be the EMU project. Greece had to 
confront a “guns-butter dilemma” dealing with its capability to connect successfully 
its need for direct and expensive arms from the one side with the realization of its 
long-term goal from the other which was identified with the fulfillment of the 
financial criteria imposed by EMU demands.150 How could Greece manage a 
combination between an effective deterrence strategy towards Turkey and the 
consequent financial costs, with the fulfillment of its obligations as candidate EMU 
member?151 
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It should not be underestimated that in the mid 1990s Greece was still trying to 
convince its European counterparts that its “black sheep” reputation was not any more 
existent. Until then Greece was judged by its partners for holding back the CFSP 
because it was often taking foreign policy decisions solely based on its own national 
interests and avoiding the position of the EU. The FYROM question example which 
was described in the context of the previous chapter belongs to this criticism category. 
The fact that EC-Turkish financial cooperation was several times interrupted due to 
Greeks’ involvement is also remarkable. The actual outcome of this veto-policy 
especially towards Turkey152 leaded in many cases to Greece’s isolation from the 
other member states. Keeping Turkey marginalized from EU had contributed to its 
own marginalization. This also meant that Greece did not manage to convince its EU 
partners that its national interests are actually identified with EU’s respective ones. As 
Loukas Tsoukalis points out, the reason behind Greece’s isolation was relying on her 
claims that its European partners mostly remained indifferent to her concerns and 
fears.153  
For the Greek Foreign Policy decision makers the adoption of a redefined or 
renewed strategy towards Turkey seemed to become more and more imperative. In 
the context of its formulation, EU could become the proper forum that would ask for 
the observance of certain rules and criteria on behalf of these candidate states that 
sought to enter the EU. Greece should take a decision to support Turkish integration 
in Europe in order to “stabilize the bilateral relationship by anchoring it in a European 
matrix”.154 Thus, the enhancement of the confirmed by Turkey “European 
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orientation” would supposedly involve and “enclose” the latter in long-term process 
pushing it in consequently to the abandonment of its revisionist policy (as claimed by 
the officials) towards its Western neighbor. This policy is supposed to include the 
embracement of an attitude firmly and fully aligned with the perceptions of modern 
European states concerning their relations with their neighbors, with special reference 
to these which already belong to EC/EU.155 According to an important number of 
Greek Foreign Policy Analysts amplifying Turkey’s European guidelines would 
establish a procedure in the framework of which Turkish elite might relinquish “the 
aggressive attitude” against Greece and embrace a policy which would solely be 
based on the templates of international law and pacts and not statecraft.156 Greece 
anticipated that providing Turkey with a possible EU candidacy would establish a 
kind of confidence atmosphere that might lead to an essential decrease of the arms 
race. The relations of good neighborliness would function as a condition that might 
open more easily “EU’s door” to Turkey. The whole rationale might guide Greek 
officials to the Europeanization of their national interests’ handling since the Greek-
Turkish dispute would become integral part of EU-Turkish relations. 
This situation gave food for a critical re-thinking regarding the channel in 
which the dynamics of Europeanization might effectively serve national interests. A 
“bottom-up interpretation” of Greek Foreign Policy’s Europeanization process might 
be useful. For Greek officials EU could emerge as the “opportunity window” that 
would enable Greece to become the main actor in the whole Turkey’s “European road 
map”. It could appear as the “European participant” and the “globalization partner” 
during that period in the eyes of the Turkish officials. Greece being supposed to seize 
the chance and exploit every advantage emanating from its identity as EU member 
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and in full cooperation and alignment with its EU partners’ positions could lead and 
introduce Turkey into the framework of the European integration system where 
“European style rules of the game” should be followed by the latter.157 This was 
considered the way in which Greece’s security concerns might become European. Its 
own bilateral dispute should be handled under the angle of EU, bearing in mind the 
views of all the other member states. This reflects a bottom-up influence of 
Europeanization on the re-formulation of Greek Foreign Policy’s rationale. While for 
the period between 1981 till 1993 the identity as EC member was exploited by Greek 
officials as “diplomatic lever and a constraining mechanism” with special reference 
towards Turkey since 1999 Europeanization has reached the point where Greece’s 
foreign policy is imbedded to its framework which is conceived as “panacea for 
eventually resolving or impacting on all of Greece’s key foreign policy concerns”.158 
Under Europeanization’s angle and its “magnetic pull” for its neighbor in the East, 
Greece seizes the chance to promote the EU perspective for Turkey resting upon the 
hope that over time tension will be reduced and dispute(s) resolved.159  
The logic behind adopting a new strategy towards Turkey through 
encouraging it becoming part of European integration process was relying on its goal 
to justify successfully the interests of the Turkish state elite on certain, defined and 
according to internationally accepted standards attitudes. Europeanization acted as a 
catalyst on the employment of this logic on behalf of Greece towards Turkey. As 
explained before, the concurrence of (un)fortunate events (Kosovo crisis and 
earthquakes) accelerated the implementation of this newly conceived and adopted 
rationale. 
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The adoption of this decision should be attributed on the bottom-up influence 
that Europeanization had on Greek Foreign Policy. Bearing in mind the views of the 
other EU partners, seeking to avoid any possible marginalization by them, 
consultations, avoiding the sole entanglement with narrowly defined national interests 
and gradually transforming these into EU considerations reflect the up-load of foreign 
policy formulation onto the EU level, as this was theoretically described in Chapter A.  
This means that the decision to enmesh Turkey into the EU institutions should not be 
ascribed only to the EMU necessity as aforementioned but also as an outcome of 
Greek Foreign Policy’s influence by the Europeanization dynamics. 
Europeanization had also a top-down effect on Greek Engagement Strategy 
towards Turkey, with special reference to the development of financial ties with its 
Eastern neighbor. As said before Greece’s participation at CFSP with the consequent 
economic character it possesses while dealing with non-EU partners entailed the 
acquirement of a financial element in the context of its foreign policy formulation. 
This economic pillar of Greece’s Europeanized Foreign Policy was supposed to be 
exploited by the Greek officials while dealing with Turkey resting their hope on the 
aspiration that conducting financial interdependence relations with the latter might 
lead to conflict resolution. The background of this logic was conceptually and 
theoretically analyzed in Chapter B. 
4. Conclusions  
Taking into account Ifantis definitions, engagement aims to maintain and 
enhance relations with Turkey as much as possible in the various policy realms. It is 
composed by some specific dimensions. With regard to politics, it is identified with 
the efforts to maximize contacts at every level as a “product” of pushing Turkey 
deeper into the European Integration system. These contacts will be solely held on EU 
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dictates. This political dimension of Greece’s Engagement Strategy towards Turkey 
has emerged, as explained before, from the bottom-up influence that Europeanization 
dynamics had exerted to the rationale behind the adoption of this strategy. With 
respect to economics, the other element of this strategy reflects the effort to expand 
financial relations and exchanges with the Eastern neighbor. As stated before, this 
aspect constitutes the outcome of a top-down impact that Europeanization has exerted 
to Greece bearing in mind the fact that the participation in CFSP “forced” Greek 
Foreign Policy to employ this financial element while being formulated.160 The 
following two chapters analyze the way the pillars of engagement strategy were 
developed in the context of the Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey. 
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CHAPTER E: THE POLITICAL PILLAR OF ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 
1. Introduction 
In the “road” towards the Helsinki Summit in December of 1999 it had not 
been clarified whether Greeks would lift their veto on Turkey’s EU candidacy status. 
Greece’s stance was dependent on its considerations whether Turkey was eager to 
fulfill the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 as well as the latter’s intention to contribute to 
feasible resolution of the Cyprus question.161 Leaving aside the value of 
Europeanization’s impact on reconsidering the Greek national interests, a possible 
shifting from a veto to the Turkish EU candidacy would be also enhanced by domestic 
support (public opinion and media) due to the above mentioned tragedy that brought 
the two people closer to each other. It should be noted that these natural catastrophes 
caused a wave of compassion across the Aegean borders which in its turn leaded to 
cooperation on non-controversial areas with reference to low politics agreements 
including tourism, science, technology, police matters, and to Greek and Turkish 
NGOs collaboration.162  
These parameters were taken into account while leading up to the Helsinki 
Summit. Despite these steps that were promoting the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, 
EU summit in Helsinki in December would constitute the main question on whether 
Greeks would actually redefine their strategy towards Turkey or not.163 
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2. Helsinki 1999  
At the last days of November 1999 the Greek government submitted a 
memorandum to the Finnish presidency of the European Union in the context of 
which it was outlining its position concerning the Turkish EU candidacy. Its structure 
was composed by three main concerns expressed on behalf of the Greek side that 
would be raised also at the Helsinki Summit: 
? The Greek delegation stated that Cyprus should become member of EU regardless 
of whether any resolution on the Cyprus question would be reached or not before 
its accession. This way Greeks sought to dissociate Turkey’s application from the 
Cyprus problem. 
?  Greece required by EU to push all the potential candidates to recognize the 
jurisdiction of International Court of Justice 
? Greek government encouraged the EU to provide Turkey with a “solid road map” 
for its EU accession and not just with the candidacy status. Greece supports a 
realistic and not a “virtual” nominee for Turkey which would simply rest on 
empty gestures of goodwill.164 According to the Greek claims, Ankara should go 
through all these procedures and fulfill all these criteria and conditions that would 
bring it closer to the realization of its “European dream”.165  
These points were revealing Greece’s inclination to embrace a renewed 
strategy towards Turkey. This memorandum was followed by more announcements 
and press releases that were reflecting these newly formulated Greek guidelines.166 
“We believe that our neighbor’s strength is our strength. To exclude a country from 
the full benefits of international society is a sure path to the kind of crises we have 
faced for too long in Southeast Europe… The heart of the European ethos lies in 
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building institutions and practices of inclusiveness. That is why Greece has always 
supported EU enlargement as means of building a bridge of security, cooperation, and 
development between nations”.167 These words belong to the Greek Minister of 
Foreign Affairs during that period, George Papandreou, mirroring to some extent the 
intentions and the strategy that Greek officials would employ towards Turkey in the 
Helsinki Summit. 
On December 10, 11, the Helsinki European Council Summit was taking 
place. The 14 other member states expected Greece to function (again) as the only 
“stumbling block” towards providing Turkey with the candidacy nominee. After 
several diplomatic contacts the Summit led to the conclusion that “Turkey is a 
candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied 
to the other candidate States”.168 Regarding Greece’s considerations the European 
Council forces candidate States to seek the resolution of any outstanding border 
disputes and other related issues on the basis of principles deriving from UN 
Chapter. In case they do not manage this they are supposed to bring the dispute to the 
International Court of Justice. The European Council will review what has been done 
until then concerning the outstanding disputes, in particular regarding the 
repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement 
through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.169 It should 
be also noted that in the same text it is noted that Cyprus will access EU even if no 
political settlement has been reached by the completion of its accession negotiations. 
The main goal Greeks managed to fulfill at Helsinki could be considered the 
transition of the Greek-Turkish dispute(s) from a bilateral field to multilateral and to 
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embed it as integral part of Euro-Turkish relations. The EU clarified that a resolution 
on the Cyprus question does not constitute a necessity for Cyprus’ accession to EU. 
With regard to the Hague Court question, the EU sets 2004 as the deadline for 
referring border and other disputes to the ICJ. The European Council takes over for 
the first time this kind of responsibility. This clause directly forces both sides to 
undertake initiatives for bilateral negotiation, and in case no outcome emerges the 
European Council looks into the question.170 The “up-load” of national interests in 
EU’s forum is supposedly achieved. 
The messages stemming out from the result of the Greek renewed strategy 
towards Turkey, known as the “Helsinki strategy”, were optimistically perceived by 
the Greek delegation. In this token the words of Papandreou do not enable any 
misinterpretation margins relating to the impression that had been left to the Greek 
side. “We assured that Cyprus would enter EU, independent from solution of the 
Cyprus problem. Contrary to Turkey’s reaction and the opposing will of many 
counterparts from both sides of Atlantic we made it”.171 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, with special reference to the bilateral issue(s) 
ascribes Helsinki’s success to the fact that these might become subject to International 
Court of Justice redress. This is a process which Turks (according to the Greek 
Foreign Policy Makers of that period) were seeking to avoid. This remark is 
interpreted in a way where the disputes with Turkey were defined as disputes with EU 
and consequently every offensive action towards Greece would be regarded as a move 
turning against the EU as a whole. He stresses that the resolution of the disputes on 
the international law basis is the “only way to commit Turkey to play in the law and 
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democracy ground which constitutes the best possible field and framework for a 
democratic country like Greece”.172 
From the other side some observations abstracted from this optimistically 
cultivated “Helsinki spirit” should not be excluded. The official EU-term “bilateral 
differences” (which seems to reflect the Turkish point of view) rather than “unilateral 
Turkish claims” (which represents the respective Greek position) should supposedly 
alleviate the manifested optimistic tones. A danger smolders that this term might 
become an issue for EU and Greek diplomacy. Although Prime Minister Kostas 
Simitis sought to clarify that the only formal and legal difference with Turkey that 
Greece recognizes is the delineation of the continental shelf, his view did not find 
positive response by all the other EU partners. Besides what matters in international 
treaties and pacts is that “scripta manent”. The absence of a specific definition of the 
term seems not to be totally aligned with Greek optimism in the aftermath of the 
Helsinki Summit. Until the time where dispute(s) would reach the point where they 
could be leaded into a legal redress there was still a deviation among Greeks and 
Turks officials relating to the substance of “outstanding disputes” term should be 
provided with. Since the two sides had not reached an agreement concerning its 
definition, the Turkish side was able to hold a broad interpretation of the term. This 
means that the latter could increase the unilateral claims that should be imbedded in 
the term in order to bring these also in the court. 
3. From Helsinki to Copenhagen 
 In the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit Greek Foreign Policy sought to 
remain aligned with the Engagement Strategy it had adopted pursuing to establish a 
climate of reconciliation and rapprochement towards Turkey. Greece’s decision to lift 
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its veto and to encourage Turkey’s European orientation amplified the dynamic of 
bilateral relations’ amelioration that had been created after the earthquakes. Having 
absorbed the logic of Europeanization due to its participation at the CFSP, Greece 
promoted collaboration with Turkey in “low policy sectors”. Influenced by the EU 
thinking, the Greek Foreign Policy makers realized that controversial and sensitive 
questions should be left aside at initial level. According to the officials, what should 
be given priority is the construction of a mutual confidence framework that would 
prepare the ground for “hard politics” discussion.173 In the context of creating this 
atmosphere both Minister of Foreign Affairs Papandreou and Cem visited Ankara 
(January 2000) and Athens (February 2000) respectively. The visit of the former one 
was hailed by the latter as being one of “historic significance” since it was the first by 
a Greek foreign minister in 38 years.174 The visits were accompanied by signing 
agreements in fields like tourism, science and technology, maritime transport, cultural 
cooperation, mutual assistance between customs administrations, reciprocal 
promotion and protection of investments, environmental protection, combating Crime, 
especially terrorism, organized crime, illicit drug trafficking and illegal 
immigration.175 
Although some important disagreements in the framework of NATO exercises 
could jeopardize the rapprochement road the two sides had decided to follow176 EU 
had become an important tool for promoting Greek national interests the way they 
were perceived. On 7th of December 2000, Turkey was invited by EU to participate at 
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the preparations of Ministers’ European Conference that would take place in Nice, in 
France and would aim at the institutional reform of EU. This way a systematic 
dialogue between the Community and Turkey illustrated a new era for the EU-Turkish 
relations.177 EU showed its eagerness to enhance its relations with Turkey and this 
was reflected by the Presidency Conclusions which were calling the latter “to submit 
its national programme for adoption of the acquis, basing it on the Accession 
Partnership”.178 
 Although this program is supposed to be compatible with the priorities 
established in the Accession Partnership, it does not constitute an integral part of the 
Accession Partnership. Concerning the Greek-Turkish relations it argues that Turkey 
will continue to develop its relations on the basis of a peace-seeking foreign policy 
and take over actions pursuing the settlement of bilateral problems with Greece 
through dialogue.179 
The next significant step in Turkish-EU relationships came with the December 
2002 Copenhagen European Council. According to it, "the EU would open 
negotiations with Turkey 'without delay' if the European Council in December 2004, 
on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission decides that 
Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria".180 
 The Greek government was determined to become the leading supporter for 
Turkey in the Copenhagen Summit.  In the days leading up to the meeting, Greek 
Prime Minister Simitis and Foreign Minister Papandreou toured European capitals to 
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have talks with EU leaders about Turkey’s EU prospects as well as Greece’s 
presidency of the EU that would start from January 2003.  Most of the EU’s leaders, 
such as French President Chirac and German Chancellor Schroeder were not 
convinced with the pace of Turkey’s reforms and were persistent about not giving a 
date until all of the Copenhagen Criteria would be met by Turkey.  Italy was one of 
the few countries which agreed with Greece on giving a date for Turkey to start 
negotiations in 2004.  In his meeting with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, 
Greek Prime Minister Simitis outlined the Greek/Italian viewpoint by saying that “the 
more the date for the initiation of accession negotiations is delayed, the more the 
message becomes less clear and positive.”  The meaning of prime minister’s message 
was that a postponement of a date for accession negotiations might be misunderstood 
as regards EU’s sincere intentions to accept Turkey as an EU member.181  Greece was 
worried what such an interpretation by Turkey could spell for Greek-Turkish 
relations. Finally the EU leaders agreed on December 16, 2004 to start accession 
negotiations with Turkey from October 3, 2005. Despite an attempt by the Austrian 
government to offer Turkey less than full membership, EU accession negotiations 
were officially launched. Greeks managed also to secure the decision that Cyprus 
along with nine other candidates would be admitted to the EU, independent from 
whether the Cyprus issue would reach any resolution or not. 
4. Greek presidency 2003 
The first semester of 2003 was coincided with the Greek presidency of the EU, 
in the framework of which it sought to forward the dialogue with Turkey. This period 
concurred with the Iraq war which created, phenomenally at least, a break-through in 
the American-Turkish relations. This evolution could supposedly amplify Turkey’s 
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European orientation as a counterbalance towards American operation that did not 
take into account the national Turkish interests, as claimed by the Turkish side.  
Greek Foreign Policy during the war, working towards the “political 
implementation of the Helsinki spirit” sought to give an impulse to its relations with 
Turkey.182 Greece’s decision to enhance Turkey’s perspective did not entail the 
automatic resolution of their bilateral dispute(s). According to Greek claims, the 
violations in the national airspace on behalf of the Turkish planes and the daily 
dogfights had been multiplied. These events compelled the Greek Foreign Minister to 
proceed with the submission of a letter of complaint to the member of the European 
Committee that is responsible for EU’s enlargement, G. Verheugen. Within this text, 
Turkey’s “aggressive attitude”, as described, towards Greece is condemned 
illustrating that its policy is consisting of a deviation from the “good neighborliness’ 
dictates” the aforementioned summits’ reports have sought to establish.183 This 
implied that the adoption and the implementation of the strategy might possess some 
limitations. 
In the Brussels Summit which would be the last one in the context of which 
the Greek side would be delegated by PASOK’s government, EU, along with Greece, 
decided to enhance its relationship with Turkey. According to the Presidency 
conclusions, Turkey was fulfilling the economic criteria and was highlighting its will 
to contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus question. However, further progress in 
judiciary and freedom fields was required.184 
Greek foreign policy, aligned with its partners was fully advocating EU’s 
policy towards Turkey and sought through several meetings and conferences to “keep 
the spirit of cooperation and dialogue” alive. Once again, it should be stressed that the 
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agenda of “low policy issues” could be implemented. Meetings among ministers and 
prime ministers became integral part of the daily diplomatic life without any 
involvement that could emanate either from EU or US. However, the thorny Aegean 
issue(s) had been left aside under the perception that it or they could easily jeopardize 
the whole rapprochement process.185 In accordance with information deriving from a 
Greek journalist, A. Papahelas both sides were close to achieve an agreement that 
would project the dispute(s) into the ICJ. Turkish unilateral claims that “grey zones” 
constitute vital issue for their interests and a topic that should be leaded also in Hague 
prevented, according to the same sources, the Greek side to proceed with this act. 
These words were perceived as a modus operandi on behalf of Turks to increase the 
part of the Aegean that might be distributed in the Aegean by the ICJ. Greek 
diplomats were supporting that Greece was not able to run this kind of risk.186 As 
described below, this fact justifies to some extent the deviation from Helsinki’s text 
that was suggesting to the contributing parts to bring the dispute(s) into the European 
Council in order to be reviewed and then to ICJ. 
5. Brussels 2004 
2004 was the year marked by many important developments: besides the 
organization of the Olympic Games which would be held in Athens and constituted 
the main challenge for Greeks, the holding of the National Greek elections, New 
Democracy’s victory, the referendum in Cyprus concerning the evolution of the 
Annan Plan and the official visit of the Turkish Prime Minister after 16 years justify 
the aforementioned. 
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 In the aftermath of the Greek elections, New Democracy had to deal with the 
thorny Cyprus question. In March 2004, during the negotiations among Greek, 
Turkish, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot side taking place in Lucerne, due to UN 
mediation, in order to achieve a resolution of the whole issue187, New Democracy 
opted for formulating a policy deviating from what PASOK did. The latter was 
officially favoring the arrangements of the last formulated Annan Plan. Although 
Greek prime minister sought to improve this plan for the benefit of the Greek-Cypriot 
side at the end he “threw the ball” to the Cypriot people claiming that they should be 
the one that would decide for the fortune of their own future. The Annan Plan which 
was brought into referendum in Cyprus was rejected by the Greek-Cypriot community 
(75%). On the contrary it was approved by Turkish-Cypriot one (65%). Karamanlis’ 
avoidance of taking a clear position towards the Annan Plan was condemned by the 
opposition party as a “hands off approach”.188 Kostas Simitis, the ex Prime Minister, 
stated that Karamanlis’ inactiveness and hesitation to favor the Annan Plan was 
illustrating the end of the Helsinki strategy that started in 1999 and had been 
developed on the basis of Greece’s active role towards a resolution of the whole 
question.189 
Besides that, the newly emerged government remained in general committed on 
the policy guidelines that PASOK had drawn and did not instigate a change in 
Greece’s policy towards the EU-Turkey relationship.  Prime Minister Karamanlis 
decided to continue the policy of rapprochement and the policy of pushing for the 
advancement of Turkey’s EU application. Commission’s report for Turkey, presented 
in October 2004, was claiming that Greek-Turkish relations had noted a positive 
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evolution without recalling the Helsinki conclusions about the 2004 deadline.190 As it 
is going to be described below, the non-reference to this deadline marked on behalf of 
New Democracy a kind of deviation of Helsinki’s spirits dictates. New Democracy 
preferred to proceed with negotiations and further dialogue rather than appealing to 
ICJ with the rationale that EU perspective might force Ankara become more 
compliant and convince it to bring the continental shelf issue to ICJ.191  
In accordance with Brussels Summit Presidency’s Conclusions Turkey finally 
received a date for the commencement of accession negotiations. Greece aligned and 
committed to the engagement strategy and willing to entangle Turkey into the “EU 
hooks” advocated the Turkish application. Turkey’s EU orientation had become the 
official Greek guideline besides the skepticism coming from some delegations 
(French and Austrian) which did not seem so eager to provide Turkey with full-
membership status. Their objections were officially justified by Turkish reluctance to 
sign the Customs Union which would indirectly lead to a de facto recognition of the 
Cyprus Republic. Mr. Erdoğan had warned that if EU rejected Turkish application 
then an escalation from Islamic fundamentalists would have increasing possibilities to 
occur.192 He was stating that it was not only Turkey, but also EU that should be called 
to “pass the exams”.193 Finally after negotiations and with the contribution also of the 
Greek side EU gave Turkey the date to start negotiations (3.10.2005).194 This fact was 
warmly welcomed by both Greece and Turkey. K. Karamanlis, in the aftermath of the 
European Council in December 2004 declared that all goals set by the Greek 
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government concerning Turkey were achieved. According to him the main target that 
was fullfilled consisted of the establishment of a European framework for Turkey’s 
attitude towards Greece that can lead to “stable reconciliation path” to the extent the 
irrevocable commitment of Turkey in good neighborhood relations with Greece and 
Helsinki’s formality concerning border disputes was improved by deleting the term 
“any outstanding disputes”. The point that was calling the contributing parts deadline 
of projecting the dispute(s) into the ICJ until 2004 was not mentioned again reflecting 
Greek representation’s decision not to appeal to this international institution. 
As aforementioned, the decision of not bringing the dispute(s) to the ICJ 
constituted a deviation from the Helsinki strategy. In the words of I. Lesser the Greek 
delegation had to deal with the following dilemma: from the one side the current time 
was considered the most proper in order to redress in a legal way the dispute(s) that 
shadow the peace in the Aegean. From the other side some circles were wondering 
whether Ankara’s European obligations agenda would be overburdened disabling thus 
its capability to comply with the European standards and demands.195 Based on this 
logic, the Greek delegation supposed that there was no pressure to appeal at that 
moment to the ICJ. They were considering that a Turkey closer to EU would embrace 
at the future means of solving its differences based on international law and not on 
statecraft.  
The opposition exerted criticism on the way Karamanlis handled the whole 
issue. In the context of the Helsinki Summit Turkey was forced to accept as dispute 
resolution a process about which it generally, as they claim, harbors doubts. They 
advocated that the policy pursued in Brussels by the newly-elected New Democracy 
government accommodated the fulfillment of Turkish wishes (as Greeks had 
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perceived) to avoid ICJ jurisdiction. New Democracy’s inactiveness or reluctance to 
follow the guidelines concerning this issue that had been drawn in 1999 was accused 
because, according to PASOK’s claims, exonerated Turkey from this obligation. They 
believe that this way and with its tactic it brought all the disputes/points of friction 
concerning the International Sea Law with EU and its borders in one Greek-Turkish 
legal difference disentangled from the EU context and projected them onto a bilateral 
table.196 
The difference between Karamanlis’ and Simitis’ point of view was the 
reading of the messages deriving from the Helsinki Conclusions. On the one hand, 
Simitis was supporting that the deadline of December of 2004 to bring the disputes in 
Hague was forcing Ankara to achieve the best possible agreement. Ankara was 
theoretically urged to contribute to the legal redress of the bilateral dispute(s) until 
2004 although this was supposedly not what Turks wished. The period until 2004 was 
considered by PASOK government as the context where Greece “should seize the 
chance to solve a very important abeyance”.197 
On the other hand Karamanlis’ think tanks, with special reference to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs during that period P. Molyviatis, gave a different 
interpretation to the same text. The outstanding dispute(s) as a term was not given a 
clear definition. As claimed before, the Turkish side was claiming the existence of 
“grey zones” in the Aegean. This claim might be also enmeshed into these 
outstanding disputes’ term which would be leaded into the ICJ. The current 
government, having been just elected, was reluctant to run the risk to legalize the 
questioning of the Greek authority on an important number of islets that the Turkish 
side might set. Newly raised to power he could not afford the political cost emanating 
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from a possibly harmful for the Greek national interests distribution of the Aegean. It 
should be noted that in the name of the “grey zones” it was not quite clear which islets 
were included or not. Turkey had not submitted any list that would exhaustively 
mention the number and the name of the islets whose authority was questioned by it. 
Ankara, according to the Greek officials, is giving a broadening interpretation of the 
term while claiming that it considers as “grey zones” every area whose status has not 
been clarified in the context of the existing international treaties. Although both 
Simitis and Karamanlis had embraced an attitude towards Turkey constructed on an 
“engagement platform” they were reflecting different kind of thoughts198. 
6. Limitations of Engagement Strategy 
In the framework of continuing the implementation of engagement strategy the 
Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Ankara in April 2005. In this context he 
sought to propose the consolidation of Conflict Building Measures in the Aegean 
among the two states. These were implying the efforts of both sides to decrease the 
number of violations in the Aegean as well as to minimize the danger that might 
emanate from possible accidents or the economic drain for defense expenses of the 
two states. Greece’s engagement strategy was supposedly amplified by the gesture of 
good will on behalf of the President of the Turkish Assembly, Bülent Arinç that 
proposed to renounce casus belli, which had been viva voce embraced by it in 1995. It 
should be noted that this move, as the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs during that 
period pointed out, does not automatically bring on a revised position of Turkey 
towards the possibility of Greeks’ extending their territorial zone.199  
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This visit rather than keeping the hope for the positive evolution of Greek-Turkish 
relations live it turned out to the “upload” of sovereignty issues to the surface and 
remind the fact that the bilateral issue(s) had not been yet resolved. During the visit 
Greek and Turkish vessels confronted each other around the Imia-Kardak rock calling 
the remembrance of the crisis that had taken place nine years ago. Under the danger of 
further escalation the incident terminated just before Molyviatis’ departure from 
Ankara. The latter decided not to proceed with any official expostulation towards 
Ankara. He opted for shortening his visit. Athens, committed to whole engagement 
strategy, sought to undermine the importance of the tensions and not get involved in 
any procedure that might jeopardize the basis of the rapprochement process.200 This 
option was also helped by the (non) reaction of the Turkish press that generally, as 
perceived by the Greek press, did not pay that much attention neither to the crisis nor 
to the visit.201 
It should be stressed that Europeans had started raising the question whether 
Turkey should become a Member of EU or just develop a “special relationship”. The 
reason was that in the aftermath of European Constitution’s rejection on behalf of 
French and Dutch people in respective referenda the fate of the European integration 
seemed to be ominous for the future. One of the reasons that leaded the people to this 
decision was claimed to be Turkey’s EU full membership perspective. Many 
Europeans harbored doubts whether the whole concept would not contribute to the 
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stagnation of the European political integration.202 EU had been facing a crisis which 
had to deal with the future of its own substance and identity.203  
In the context of EU-Turkish relations the report of the European Commission 
focusing on the Greek interests was mentioning that “the Commission is satisfied with 
the declaration of the President of the Turkish Grand Assembly about the repeal of 
casus belli in April 2005 which was repeated through the words of Abdullah Gül, 
noting also that there was no continuity from the Turkish side concerning the same 
issue.This report states also that Turkey’s progress will be measured in particular 
against its “unequivocal commitment to good neighborly relations and its undertaking 
to resolve any outstadning disputes” aligned with the principle of peaceful settlement 
of disputes as UN Chapter defines, including compuslory jusirsdiction of ICJ. It is 
required to continue the “support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of 
the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with the principles on 
which the Union is founded”.204 Turkey is also called on to take immediately the 
essential measures in order to secure the rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, to 
protect the religious foundations and to promote the re-opening of the Theological 
School of Halki.205 These exhortations on behalf of Europeans towards Turkey are 
reflecting according to Greek officials, Greece’s diplomatic manipulations and 
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intentions to “encircle” the Turkish aggressive attitude, as perceived, into the context 
of the European-Turkish relations.206 
Objections were raised by the opposition. The generally formulated phrases 
concerning “the commitment for good neighborhood and resolution of outstanding 
disputes in accordance with the UN Charter” still exist. According to the same 
interpretations there are no committing phrases that would allow Athens to force 
Ankara to fulfill the aforementioned criteria in order to continue its “European 
journey”. For instance in this text there is no reference that condemns the expressed 
by Turkish assembly casus belli resolution in case Greece extends its territorial 
zone.207 
According to Thanos Dokos it would be a naivety to anticipate that the start of 
negotiations between EU and Greece would lead to direct and radical shift of the 
Turkish Foreign Policy and abandoning of the classic Turkish positions over the 
Aegean. Turkey will not pursue to abrogate them unilaterally. Even Greece’s 
European partners will not opt for putting more pressure on unilateral concessions of 
behalf of Ankara. EU can be used as the framework that will contribute to the 
accommodation of a (re)solution that will lead to reciprocal concessions.208 
In December of 2006 Turkey’s European orientation had started to become a 
question. As the European Commission had pointed out, Turkey had not fullfiled its 
obligation of full non-discriminatory impelementation of the Additional Protocol to 
the Association Agreement accusing it of posing restriction policies towards Republic 
of Cyprus.209 This urged EU to slow down membership talks and freeze EU-Turkish 
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relations in eight fields, calling on Turkey to open its ports to Cypriot ships.210 
Regarding the Greek interests, the European Council stated that Turkey should be 
committed to positive relations with its neighbors and to peaceful settlements of 
disputes in accordance with the UN Charter, including if necessary, jurisdction ICJ. 
The above mentioned justified EU’s decision to “freeze its relationship” with Turkey 
while “keeping locked” chapters covering policy areas relevant to Turkey’s 
restrictions towards Cyprus until the Commission verifies that Turkey has fulfilled its 
commitments emanating from the Additional Protocol.211 
Although Greeks had strongly advocated Turkey’s application as full member 
they had to align themselves with the Commission’s recommendations and the 
position of the other EU partners since Turkey’s attitude was perceived as ignoring 
basic EU norms and principles. In the words of the Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Y. Valinakis, reflecting the official Greek position, EU having formulated a 
clear and integrated position among its member states traced out a line of Turkey’s 
“European conduct” and rejected every rationale of an “a la carte” integration. He 
stated that Turkey is not able to anticipate any negotiation that would question the 
foundations and the substance of European integration. He pointed out that Greek 
government has constructed the pillars of a strategy that would combine from the one 
side Greece’s sincere support towards Turkey’s adaptation needs and from the other a 
clearly defined process of tight rein and fair judgment. He concluded that this strategy 
aims to achieve the Europeanization of Turkish attitude and to ensure the authenticity 
of this perspective which can be realized only in the framework and the base of its full 
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adaptation. According to him full adaptation is identified with transformation and the 
latter with becoming full EU member.212 
After a diplomatically unfruitful and stagnation period in November 2007 
Greek-Turkish relations were given a kind of priority in the Foreign Policy Agendas 
on behalf of both states as this was reflected by Turkish Foreign Minister’s visit to 
Greece. His visit was initially accompanied by the signing of 5 CBM’s regarding the 
military cooperation of the two states in the Aegean and raising hopes for the re-
opening of a new era for the Greek-Turkish relations. 
The statement of the current Greek President, K. Papoulias to the Turkish 
Minister “you choose your friend but not your neighbor… we are determined by 
history to live together and we must live peacefully in order to be able to provide our 
people with cooperation perspectives” was supposed to condense politically the 
substance and the content of Babacan’s visit in Greece. It should be mentioned that 
Papoulias, as ex Foreign Minister and contributor to the Papoulias-Jilmaz 
Memorandum signed in 1988 was aware of the fact that CBM’s was and is 
functioning as the “pillow” that would absorb the tensions emerging in the context of 
a long-term Greek-Turkish dispute.213 
The continuity was not perceived the same way by the Greek officials. As it 
was leaked out from the press, Babacan seemed to raise a question whether Kurdish 
organizations are operating in the Greek ground and getting financed by the Greek 
authorities springing a surprise on the Greek government. Phenomenally at least, he 
adopted also Turkish headquarters’ claims which were blaming during the same 
period Greece for harassment of Turkish planes on behalf of respective Greek and 
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violating the Turkish national airspace. His visit to Thrace with the consequent 
presence in front of a minority audience of Turkish origin, the fact that he was 
repetitively calling them as “Turkish brothers”, his exhortation towards them to 
appeal to the European Court in order to assert their rights and his recommendation 
not to feel afraid (obviously because Turkey would be close to them) raised a question 
among the Greek diplomatic circles concerning the “friendly” intentions beyond his 
coming to Greece.214 
7. Conclusions 
As a conclusion, the political pillar of the engagement strategy has not brought 
into the surface the expected outcomes. The bilateral dispute(s) are still alive. Greeks 
are afraid that Turkey is going to work as a revisionist power also in Thrace.215 The 
main element that encodes clearly Turkish strategy, as Greek diplomats claim, is the 
intention to officially integrate the Thracian Muslim minority issue into the Greek-
Turkish agenda. The fact is that what the political engagement strategy has achieved 
is the establishment of a political atmosphere where the dispute(s) can be more easily 
discussed. Moreover, as the Greek official position states, if Turkey softens its hard-
line approach towards the Cyprus dispute, then its chances to access EU would most 
likely increase. 
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CHAPTER F: FINANCIAL PILLAR OF ENGAGEMENT 
1. Introduction 
In the context of the previous chapter it was mentioned that Greece’s 
participation at CFSP entailed the adoption and the acquirement of a financial element 
in the formulation of its foreign policy. Economic diplomacy has gradually become 
vital mechanism of Greek Foreign Policy. In the name of economic diplomacy what 
could be meant is the use of political influence in order to advance international and 
bilateral trade and financial relationships, decrease the cost and risks that could 
possibly emanate from cross-border transactions, develop energy and transport 
networks and establish a climate that would facilitate all these objectives.216 
This policy was to a large extent embracing the majority of the states in the 
Balkan region. Greece in the Balkans, as referred in the previous chapter, sought to 
develop a multilateral foreign policy (along with its EU partners) designed to establish 
successful transition policies toward market economy in almost every state in its 
northern borders. Could Turkey constitute an “implementation field” of Greece’s 
newly formulated economic diplomacy concept? 
Greece’s decision to align itself with the other member-states in order to 
provide Turkey with the EU candidacy status and to advocate the Turkish application 
constitutes part of the previously described engagement strategy in political terms. 
But as Ifantis points out, this should be composed and amplified also by an economic 
feature. The complementary concept of it should reflect Greece’s intention to expand 
financial relations and grow exchanges with the Eastern neighbor.217 Being influenced 
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by its participation at CFSP, and taking into account the “top-down” impact that 
Europeanization had on imbedding economy and “soft-politics” issues in Greek 
Foreign Policy Agenda, Greek officials are realizing that they could “operationalize” 
the concept of the before described economic diplomacy on the “engagement 
platform” towards Turkey. Exploiting the dynamics that have been emerged from the 
development of an EU context for their bilateral relations in the aftermath of the 
Helsinki Summit, Greeks seem eager to remain committed to this strategy by 
enmeshing to it a financial dimension. The last one might be initially considered 
inconceivable out of the European basis on which the Greek-Turkish relations are 
seeking to be built. It should be taken into due consideration that the economic aspect 
in the historical context of the bilateral relations was almost absent. The EU Turkish 
application and the perspective of enmeshing Turkey deeper into the European 
institutions motivated the Greek side to enhance its financial relations with it and 
work parallel to the whole European process. 
2. Investments  
Turkey’s European “road map” and the consequent dictates for the 
formulation of an attractive to foreign investments domestic environment has drawn 
Greek businessmen’s attention. In the aftermath of a significant economic crisis in 
2001, Turkey under the templates of International Monetary Fund was obliged to 
implement a program of structural changes that would pull the inflow of foreign 
capital and investments. The system of subsidizing investment that Turkey has 
developed to attract foreign capital relates to a big variety of goods and investment. 
Foreign businesses, including Greek, could take advantage of subsidies and the 
incentives which are also given to local businesses. This equal treatment of businesses 
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is emerged and ensured by the legislation and the Agreements for “Mutual Protection 
and Promotion of Investments” after they have obtained the “Certificate” from the 
General Directorate of Foreign Investments. Turkey offers Greek businesses also 
other great opportunities as a result of its rapidly growing economy, its large domestic 
market, its large manual labor supply, its geographical proximity and its strong bonds 
with the countries of Caucasus and Central Asia.218 All these along with the existence 
of a government during that period which was supporting the whole concept and the 
fact that Turkey was carrying the identity of an EU candidate seemed in the eyes of 
the Greek entrepreneurs a convenient ground for further cooperation. Services with 
special reference to banking sector, constructional materials, industrial and 
communication equipment, information technology, perfumery and cosmetic 
products, silver and steel consist of fields in the context of which the Greek 
investments could operate.219 
 Until 2008 it is estimated that more than 80 firms are doing business in 
Turkey, with Greek investments climbing to over €3 billion in 2006 instead of €400 
million in 2005 and €50 million in 2004.220 The most significant kind of investment 
takes place in the bank sector. As it is well known, in 2006 National Bank of Greece, 
the largest bank in Greece and the biggest company by value on the Athens Stock 
Exchange during that period, paid $2.774bn for a controlling stake in Finansbank AS, 
Turkey's sixth-largest publicly traded bank.221 The buy out has been dubbed as the 
largest ever overseas investment by a Greek company. Turks and analysts pegged the 
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deal as an endorsement of Turkey's efforts to join the European Union and a sign of 
greater cooperation to come between the two nations. This purchase reached totally a 
cost of €5billion integrating the future evolution of Greece’s biggest bank into the 
developments of Turkish economy and domestic politics. It should be also noted that 
this acquisition in Turkey was provided with the tacit support on behalf of the Greek 
government and it could be supposed that “it renders credible the prospect of Greece 
benefiting from Turkey’s EU accession”.222 In this context it facilitates in domestic 
terms the development of foreign policy advocating Turkey’s European orientation. 
NBG and Finansbank, exploiting the dynamic that has been developed in the 
aftermath of the before mentioned buy out, undertook the initiative to bring into touch 
delegates from 50 Greek companies activating in the fields of tourism, energy, 
shipbuilding yards and agriculture products with Turkish entrepreneurs operating in 
similar areas. ‘Tsakos Group’, ‘Attiki Business’, ‘Capital Maritime’, ‘Jet Oil’, 
‘Redestos Agriculture-Technology’, ‘SATO’, ‘Delta Chemical Products’, ‘Mihailidis 
Smoke Industry’, ‘Greek Textile Industry’ and ‘Seloda’ constitute some of the 
enterprises which were represented in the context of these meetings. The conclusion 
of them was that wider “business communications channels” for further cooperation 
had been established. This cooperation can be detected in the sectors of credit-
financial services, insurance system, structures and purchases, joint ventures and 
consolidations of companies emanating from both states.223 
Other Greek banks sought to seize similar opportunities that were emerging 
from the wind of change in the Greek-Turkish relations. Without achieving the size 
and the importance of NBG investment, Eurobank came up with the decision to 
proceed with buy out of Tekfenbank, a bank with 31 branches join forces in the 
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Turkish financial services market.224 Greek Alpha Bank also sought to proceed with 
the 50% purchase of the Turkish Alternatif Bank from Anadolu Endustri Holding.225 
The transaction was unsuccessfully terminated in 2007 in accordance with a decision 
made by Turkish authorities responsible for supervising the function of credit 
foundations. The official Turkish position claimed that reason for this evolution was 
lying on the presence of Mr. Apostolidis, ex Head of Greek Intelligence Services, at 
the Board of Directors of the Bank. This decision harbored doubts and raised 
questions whether Turkish officials were eager to accept the further inflow of Greek 
banks in their ground.226 
Besides the banks, other Greek companies are operating in Turkey also. 
INTRACOM HOLDINGS Group is today one of the largest multinational groups in 
Greece activating in Telecommunications, e-Government, Banking & Enterprise IT 
Systems, Defense Electronics and Construction. A typical example is the successful 
joint venture of TURKCELL and INTELTEK, a company of INTRALOT Group that 
runs the local popular game IDDAA since 2004.227 In the same context Pouliadis 
Information Technology Group in cooperation with Index Computers, a Turkish 
company entered the Istanbul Stock Market under the perspective to cooperate with 
small-sized enterprises emanating from every Turkish city.228 
Sarantis Group, known cosmetics business in Greece established Sarantis 
Türkiye (subsidiary), whose main activity constitutes the distribution of mass market 
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fragrances and sun care products of Sarantis GR.229 Fresh Homemade Cosmetics, a 
soap making industry, has also done significant investments in Istanbul and 
Ankara.230 SATO, a Greek furniture industry possesses a subsidiary company in 
Turkey, TCC Buro Koltuk Ltd. 
Titan Company specialized in freight brokerage, bulk transportation, and 
commodity brokerage231 entered the Turkish market while purchasing 50% of Adocim 
Cimento Beton Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S stock for €90.5 million. Halkor, large-scale 
modern industrial company with over sixty years of expertise in metal processing232 
was given recently the “green light” by the Turkish Competition Board and the ability 
to buy out 50.1% of Sega Bakir S.A stock which is activating in the field of pipes’ 
production and sale in Turkey.233  
Nireus, a Greek company which constitutes the biggest producer of sea bream 
and sea bass worldwide, had installed its operations in 2006 in Turkey by acquiring 
the Turkish company IKLNAK A.S.234 Selonda, an aquaculture company who aims at 
the reproduction, on-growing, and commercial distribution of Mediterranean fish 
species235 possesses also subsidiaries in Turkey (Fjord Marin Turkey AS and 
Elektrosan Deniz Ürünleri). Greece’s Thrace Plastics teamed up with Turkey’s 
Teknik Plastik, established a food packaging factory in Istanbul, labeled as "Τhrace 
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Teknik Ambalaj Sirketi A.S”.236 In a similar fashion Crete’s Plastics has purchased 
75% of Turkish company Sanchroma from “Gumussuyu Carpet Group”.  
It should be noted that the largest-scale business partnership constitutes the 
one between two major construction companies, Turkey’s ENKA and Greece’s 
Technodomiki which have jointly taken over the construction of a new city in Oman 
(Blue City) with a budget over than €12 billion.237 
However, it should be stressed that according to Turkish assertions the 
existing legislative framework in Greece prevents Turkish business people from 
investing in Greece. The Greek officials support that these problems don’t exist and 
argue that the national Law facilitates new investments the fact is that the Turkish 
Businessmen with the exclusion of some examples (Ipekyol, Koton which have to do 
with clothes and Inci Shoes) haven’t managed to make remarkable investments or 
mixed investments in Greece. 
3. Bilateral trade 
 Mainly based on the initially positive developments that emerged after Turkey 
had been provided with the EU candidacy status bilateral trade became part of Greek-
Turkey relations’ realities. Being influenced by the political tensions that had 
shadowed previous years the bilateral relations this sector was not able to flourish. It 
should be stressed that Turkey according to Greek exporters, represents an 
increasingly dynamic export market orientation for their products, especially after the 
beginning of EU-Turkey’s agreements’ implementation. In their perspective this 
market might become even more attractive since Greek firms, considering the 
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difficulties they might face in order to place their products in the competitive EU 
markets, turn out to find an easy outlet in Turkey.238 
The Economic Cooperation Agreement signed on 4 February 2000 and which 
was mentioned before, rules the institutional framework of Greek-Turkish economic 
cooperation.239 The volume of bilateral trade between the two financially strongest 
members of Southeastern Europe has been on an “upward trajectory”.240 The numbers 
in Table 1 show that the trade volume which was approximately €415 millions in 
1996 increased to €1050 billion in 2000, €1245 in 2003, €1547 billion in 2004 and 
€1666 billion in 2005.241 The bilateral trade exceeded $2.17 billion in the framework 
of 10-month period from January to October 2006.242 Greek exports of goods to 
Turkey have noted a significant average annual growth rate of approximately 30% 
making Turkey 5th as an exporting market size covering 4.5% of the total Greek 
exports and 14th supplier of Greek market’s good corresponding to the 2,25% of the 
total imports. From the other side Turkish exports to Greece have recorded an average 
annual growth rate of 14% which, however, constitutes a small share of total Turkish 
exports.243 In 2005 the value of the 20 most important Greek exporting products was 
absorbing 74% of the total exports’ value, while the value of the 20 most important 
importing products only the 31% of the imports from the neighbor country. 
Although Turkey has become important trade partner of Greece, the 
contribution of the latter to the trade exchanges of the former is relatively limited. 
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According to recent data the Greek exports to the neighboring country represents 
0,9% of the Turkish imports and the Greek’s imports from Turkey 1,6% of the total 
Turkish exports.244 The Greek imports during that period of time are higher in value 
from the exports, resulting to a deficit in the trade balance which arose from 11 
million dollars to 528 taking into account also that the Turkish exporting trade has 
continuous deficits with other partners. Structural reasons occur which enable Turkey 
to have more exports more than Greece. Turkey turns out to be a more open economy 
“equipped” with a greater concentration of exports in capital intensive-sectors than 
Greece.245 The contribution of manufacturing to GDP is higher in the case of Turkey 
than in the respective one of Greece and Turkey’s GDP is larger than Greece’s. The 
exporting products on behalf of Greeks are mainly restricted on stocks and especially 
cotton and fuels.246 That means that these exports consist of commodities with a low 
value-added component. From the other side, the main part of Turkish exports, due to 
the structure of Turkey’s economy as aforementioned, consists of much more 
diversified manufactured goods with a higher value-added component.247 It is also 
claimed that the other reason this deficit exists is that Greek exporters face various 
bureaucratic obstacles in accessing Turkish markets.248 
The largest increase seen in trade figures between Turkey and Greece has 
become more evident in the Aegean Region of Turkey. The proximity of the Aegean 
Region to the Greek Islands in the Aegean Sea has also affected the amount of export 
from the Aegean Region. In the first six months of 2005 Aegean Region exports 
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levels were at nearly $42.5 million, while during the first six months of 2006 Aegean 
Region exports reached nearly $71 million.249 Smyrna had exports to Greece with a 
value of €183.156.896 while the imports of Greece came up to €77.773.296. 
Generally the exports to the Turkish coasts was close to €3.255.159, while the imports 
had a value of €6.730.300. Although the numbers could not be considered impressive, 
especially if the geographical proximity of the referred places is taken into account, it 
could be assumed that the improvement perspectives can be positively regarded.   
In this framework Smyrna’s Chamber of Commerce proceeded with the 
establishment of a network of the Aegean Portal in order to contribute to the process 
of the Greek-Turkish trade relations improvement and to the amplification of the 
existing trade dynamic. With the help of this system companies which want either to 
export or to import from the one country to the other, can deal and function in a more 
transparent field for cooperation.250 
Sarik Tara, President of the Greek-Turkish Business Council, in an interview 
states that “the share of bilateral trade in the total trade volume is just 1% and 2% 
respectively. If we can increase this figure up to 5%, then we can say that we have 
become good partners”.251 According to the future prospects of trade integration 
between Greece and Turkey, these will definitely depend on the bilateral political 
stability between the two. 
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4. Energy Cooperation 
It is a fact that international energy policies constitute an important aspect of 
the newly emerged globalized arena during the 21st century. Both states, realizing the 
increasing gravity that this sector would have in the contribution of their foreign 
policy formulation came up with the decision to cooperate in energy issues. Greece 
and Turkey, eager to become significant transit hubs for natural gas towards major 
European markets, reached an agreement concerning the establishment of a natural 
gas pipeline that would bring natural gas from Azerbaijan and then export the 
majority of it to Italy and extensively to Western Europe. This cooperation should be 
imbedded also in the whole rapprochement process that is taking place among the two 
states. 
The Turkish-Greek pipeline concept consists of a key component of the EU’s 
Southern European Gas Ring (SEGR) program, which aims to interconnect the gas 
grids of Turkey, Greece and Italy by the end of 2010252 and transport non-Russian 
produced and exported natural gas to Europe from the Caspian Sea with special 
reference to Azerbaijan and its main natural gas sources which lie in Shah Deniz. The 
initial ¼ part of this Russian by-pass will be covered through creation of the South 
Caucasus Pipeline which is supposed to transfer Shah Deniz’s output to Ankara. From 
Turkey’s capital it crosses Turkish national grid up to the Greek border at Evros 
River.253 The rationale behind the construction of this pipeline rests on geopolitical 
concerns and the will of both states to provide the Western markets with a reliably 
alternative supply.254 
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In this framework a Memorandum of Understanding was initially signed by 
Greece’s Public Gas Corporation (DEPA) and Turkey’s BOTAS, the Greek and 
Turkish state-owned natural gas utilities. According to it the gas-pipeline runs from 
Karacabey on the south side of the Marmara Sea to Ipsala on the Turkey-Greece 
border. Greece has built a 57-mile section of the pipeline, which links with Greece’s 
natural gas transmission network at Komitini. The Turkey-Greece pipeline which is 
operational pumps formerly 28 Bcf per year starting from late 2006. The pipeline will 
eventually pump 407 Bcf per year by 2012, 111 Bcf of which will be consumed by 
Greece with the rest potentially shipped to Italy via a new link currently under 
development between the two countries under the Adriatic.255 The $720 million 
Aegean pipeline (also known as the Greece-Turkey pipeline), a joint venture 
developed by DEPA and BOTAS has been completed and already operational. Its 
estimated annual transport capacity is 11.6 billion m3 of natural gas. Construction 
work on the section of the pipeline between Karacabey of Turkey and Komotini 
(Greece) has finished whilst the part between Greece and Italy is currently in the 
phase of feasibility studies and probing.256 
 
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Economic+Diplomacy/Energy+Affairs/ 
 
Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis and Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan illustrating the importance of this agreement met on the bridge over 
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the Evros River, at the border between Greece and Turkey, for the inauguration of the 
Greek-Turkish natural gas pipeline that went into operation on that day.257 In 2007 
they met again on the same place in order to underscore the significance of the 
venture in boosting ties between the rival nations”.258 
5. Aegean cooperation 
A supposed cooperation in the Aegean Sea could mainly concern the islands 
of the Northeastern Sea, the Dodecanese and Turkish coast lines. In this region, due to 
the proximity of the Greek islands with the Turkish coastlines a new cooperation area 
among Greece and Turkey could emerge, especially in the field of tourism and sea 
transfers. Although for many years there was a kind of competition in the context of 
these sectors some timid steps on behalf of both states for increasing cooperation can 
be observed. Regarding the cooperation in the tourism sector, besides the Turks and 
Greeks that visited each others country, some initial attempts have been done that 
could help the two coasts profit from every tourist period. In the Financial 
Cooperation Memorandum that was signed in 30.6.2005 the two countries came up 
with an agreement in order to establish a coastal navigation connection between the 
ports of Ainos, Dardanelles, Alexandroupolis, Maronia, Sam Thrace and Imvros.259  
As we see from Table 6 the Greek visitors in the Turkish islands are rapidly 
increasing. The corresponding Turks have not achieved to reach Greeks’ number. 
Many Turkish citizens that wish to visit the Greek islands have to overcome important 
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obstacles which consist of the strict EU visa policy concerning their accession in the 
territory of some EU members.260 
In 13 November 2006 Greece and Turkey signed a tourism cooperation 
protocol envisioning a greater exchange of information on issues of infrastructure and 
especially maritime tourism, including potential marina partnerships and the hosting 
of joint sailing regattas. The protocol was signed on the sidelines of the 2nd joint 
declaration by the Greek Minister of Tourism Fani Palli-Petralia and her Turkish 
counterpart Atilla Koc. The committee agreed to enable and make travel of third 
country tourists between the two countries and to inaugurate new ferry boat links. In 
her brief comments, Petralia noted that through mutual cooperation in the tourism 
sector, Greece and Turkey can better prepare for the future and achieve better results 
vis-à-vis international competition.261 
6. Conclusions 
The question that still concerns the Greek foreign policy makers is whether a 
possible formulation of financial interdependence relations between the two countries 
is entailing a conflict resolution that would enable both Greece and Turkey be much 
better off reaching a final reconciliation, a new historic compromise, reminiscent of 
the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 and the Venizelos-Ataturk Treaty of Friendship of 
1930.262 The financial aspect of Greek-Turkish relations is based and reinforced by 
Turkey’s “EU road map”. The majority of financial bilateral agreements and 
investments occurred in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit in 1999 in the context 
of which Greeks decided to lift their veto that was supposed to be its traditional 
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foreign policy line in the framework of EU-Turkish relations and draw with its other 
partners some EU guidelines for Turkey. All these imply that the financial part of 
Greece’s engagement strategy towards Turkey relies to an important extent on the 
respective political one which consists of enmeshing Turkey deeper into the European 
institutions. The arising question is the following one: if the evolution on EU-
Turkey’s relations is not the expected one, as envisaged from the Greek side, and the 
hopes for imbedding Turkey in the EU context begin to “evanesce”, how could Greek 
officials predict the future of Greece’s financial engagement strategy towards Turkey? 
Can Greek-Turkish financial cooperation remain unaffected by a possible negative 
development in Turkey’s European orientation?  
What emerges from the before mentioned is that the financial interdependence 
is only a good basis for the Greek-Turkish conflict resolution. It doesn’t mean that the 
bilateral financial improvement entails automatically the political problems’ 
resolution since the whole financial cooperation is placed in the European political 
realm. It could be assumed that the stability in the political relations with special 
reference to the continuity of Turkey’s EU course can establish the suitable 
framework in which the financial one can be improved.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
As stated in Chapter B every strategy pursued by a state aims to protect and 
ensure in the most effective way its national security, as the latter is perceived by the 
officials that draw the guidelines of state’s foreign policy.  The arising question is 
whether Greece, having embraced during the last decade an engagement strategy 
towards its Eastern neighbor, has eliminated every security concern related to it. 
In a short run the signs regarding the effectiveness of this strategy seem not 
the optimistic ones the officials might have initially anticipated. Among the major 
parties in Greece (PASOK and New Democracy) which have pursued this policy, 
what has been observed so far, is a remarkable continuity, even during the recent thaw 
period, in holding the perception that Turkey still remains the country’s major 
security concern. Reports emanating from the comments and analyses of various 
Greek security and political analysts and policymakers263 state that Turkey still 
possesses revisionist aspirations  
The question that could easily emerge is whether the recent rapprochement 
period of Greek-Turkish relations, a phase that has come about during the past nine 
years, involves risks and/or opportunities. It is a question that arises naturally as the 
Greek-Turkish relationship has oscillated between entente and détente for the past 50 
years. Given their fundamental divergent approaches and positions, Greek and 
Turkish foreign policy makers do not seem able to reach an agreement regarding the 
resolution of the Aegean dispute(s) in the foreseeable future. Greece has rested its 
hope on EU support for its position on a legal settlement of the Aegean problems with 
Turkey. However, it should be taken into account that Athens would prefer its EU 
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partners to become more active and helpful in coping with what it considers to be a 
Turkish threat to its sovereign rights in the Aegean. 
From the other side, in a long-term analysis Greek optimism is relied on the 
expectation that Turkey will be gradually integrated into the dictates of the European 
system on the basis of which European practices and norms of behavior and certain 
European-style ‘rules of the game’ have to be followed while dealing with Aegean 
dispute(s). The dealing with the bilateral issue(s) will be held on a European platform 
where the disputing parts are supposed to have renounced the use of military force. 
The more Turkey follows and implements the European “road map” the more possible 
it is to adopt policies aligned with it. The EU-membership carrot is able to put 
pressure on Turkey in order to modify its narrow nationalistic outlook as it is 
perceived by the Greek officials and enable it to embrace policies constructed more 
on international law and agreements than on geopolitical considerations and statecraft 
as it is supposed to pursue till today’s.264 
Greeks, taking advantage of the EU framework that had been built for Turkey, 
managed to cultivate financial ties with Turkey. The rationale behind this operation 
was lying on the hope that the establishment of possible economic interdependence 
among the two states will function in a prohibitive way towards every armed conflict 
possibility. This might contribute to the creation and emergence of a new platform on 
which the bilateral dispute or points of friction can be discussed and analyzed. 
According to the aforementioned it becomes clear that this strategy 
presupposes patience and domestic support on behalf of the state that initiates it. The 
avoidance of polarization among the political parties concerning the implementation 
of this strategy should be considered a prerequisite not only for the viability but also 
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for the success of it. The consensus between the political parties should contribute to 
the appeasement of public opinion and media in case a tension between the two states 
arises. It is possible that the people and the media, being neither able nor willing to 
comprehend the complexities diplomacy has to cope with, will come up with foregone 
conclusions according to which the pursued policy is interpreted as a sign of 
weakness and submissiveness towards a state whose unilateral “revisionist” claims (as 
these are perceived) are by the time increasing. The entanglement of these sensitive 
foreign policy issues with populism channels might jeopardize the effectiveness of the 
strategy and the ultimate goal it aims to serve which consists of the national security 
enhancement. Thus, the formulation of this consensus constitutes an imperative need 
that might safeguard this strategy, especially in cases whereas the implementation of 
it does not lead to a gesture of good will on behalf of the other side. 
Having said this every policy is subject to sort of criticism and questioning. 
The relative abatement of tension in Greek-Turkish relations that became apparent 
after 1999 has been reinforced by the EU’s decision in Helsinki to grant candidate 
status to Turkey.265 The main obstacle both for further Europeanization of Greek 
Foreign Policy in general and for the engagement strategy towards Turkey have to 
deal with the fact that their viability rests upon an evolution that is not stemming out 
from Greece’s foreign policy choices. The whole structure of the strategy has been 
constructed on Turkey’s full integration perspective into the EU. That means that the 
further development and continuity of both variables (Europeanization and 
Engagement Strategy) depend on the question whether Turkey seizes the chance and 
intensifies its efforts to become a deeper part of the European world or not. If Turkey 
decides that the European orientation is not considered its main political priority and 
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becomes “unhooked” from the EU’s dictates, how what will be Greek Foreign 
Policy’s future in Europeanization and engagement terms? It is obvious that during 
this period Greece is seeking to exploit every advantage is emanating from its identity 
as EU member in order to push Turkey become deeper integrated into the EU. If 
Turkey does not “win the European bet” and returns to an unpredictable for the 
European and Greek given policy, how can Greece being its western neighbor rely on 
the fact that Europeanization process will automatically resolve the disputes? 
This question becomes more crucial if someone bears in mind that till now EU 
does not seem to hold a clear and coherent position concerning its future relation with 
Turkey. The messages coming from EU circles claim that the majority of EU 
members seem willing to turn down the full membership status and provide Turkey 
with the idea of “special-preferential relationship” as an alternative choice. Although 
the content of this status is exposed to further investigation it seems that this possible 
relationship might be constructed on two pillars: a) Custom Union and Turkish 
participation at a more enlarged internal market (like Norway) and b) selective 
participation of Turkey at CFSP.266 
This argumentation seems to be adopted by one of the contributors of Greece’s 
Engagement Strategy towards Turkey, C. Simitis. Although during his incumbency as 
Prime Minister he was favoring the full membership status for Turkey, according to 
him now this possible evolution might encumber the further progress of European 
integration and unification.267 Claiming that Greeks should seek the maintenance of 
engagement strategy towards Turkey, the guidelines which drawn in the Helsinki 
should be differentiated. In his words Greece, should not commit itself to specific 
                                                 
266 P. C Ioakimidis, “Greece and the Preferential Relationship for Turkey” in Newspaper TA NEA, 
7.7.2006 
267 Costas Simitis’ Speech at The Cambridge University with subject «European Challenges And the 
Lisbon Treaty» 31.1.2008 http://www.costas-simitis.gr/content/137 
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directions (i.e. full membership for Turkey) but make clear that its position will 
depend on the coming evolutions. As he states the Greek delegation should proceed 
with discussion with its EU partners on the topics it is occupied with and bring out the 
existence of issues that still remain unresolved.268  
If this evolution comes true it means that the Turkish state will not participate 
at the EU institutions and bodies (European Council and European Commission) and 
common policies. It is argued that this way EU may become enabled to control 
Turkey’s market and its geo-strategic position without being obliged to “baptize” 
Turkey as the new member of its “family”. Raising questions whether this possible 
evolution serves EU interests or not the author would like to draw the attention on the 
Greek case: does this possible evolution help Greece ensure the effectiveness and 
viability of its strategy? In the context of this relationship status it is probable that 
Turkey will not be forced to discipline itself and comply with the norms, principles, 
rules and mechanisms of EU. That implies that the further Europeanization of Turkey 
both in domestic and in foreign policy terms might remain an illusion for the Greek 
Foreign Policy Makers that were envisaging a more Europeanized Turkey in the 
future with whom they could discuss the bilateral issue(s) from a different point of 
view than they do now. 
This possible evolution might cause a critical re-thinking among the Foreign-
Policy Makers, international relations’ scholars and political analysts. Which is the 
most effective “channel” through which Greece is able to protect its national interests 
and enhance its own security if Turkey’s EU full membership does not take effect? 
Does the adoption of containment strategy which has been pursued so far until 1999 
constitute an adequate solution or does it lead to a non-exit situation as described 
                                                 
268 C. Simitis, “Turkey’s Relationship with Europe Why Should We Change Tactic [in Greek]  in 
Newspaper TO VIMA 17.2.2008 
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before? Greeks might anticipate that the cultivation of stronger financial ties might 
facilitate interdependence relations which would lead to a possible conflict resolution 
and reconciliation without EU’s contribution. Is it possible? Future will show…  
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APPENDIX I 
HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL 10 AND 11 DECEMBER 1999 
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
I. PREPARING FOR ENLARGEMENT 
The enlargement process 
4. The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process, 
which now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The candidate 
States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. They must share 
the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this 
respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes 
in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make 
every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. 
Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any 
outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession 
process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of 
Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that 
compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council 
is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all 
the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union. 
 
 
9. (a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and 
expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring the 
process to a successful conclusion. 
(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the 
accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the 
completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be 
made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of 
all relevant factors. 
 
 
11. In the negotiations, each candidate State will be judged on its own merits. This 
principle will apply both to opening of the various negotiating chapters and to the 
conduct of the negotiations. In order to maintain momentum in the negotiations, 
cumbersome procedures should be avoided. Candidate States which have now been 
brought into the negotiating process will have the possibility to catch up within a 
reasonable period of time with those already in negotiations if they have made 
sufficient progress in their preparations. Progress in negotiations must go hand in 
hand with progress in incorporating the acquis into legislation and actually 
implementing and enforcing it.  
12. The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted 
in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms 
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towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate State destined 
to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate 
States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate 
States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. 
This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards 
fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of 
human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a). Turkey will 
also have the opportunity to participate in Community programmes and agencies and 
in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the context of the accession 
process. An accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of previous European 
Council conclusions while containing priorities on which accession preparations must 
concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations of a 
Member State, combined with a national programme for the adoption of the acquis. 
Appropriate monitoring mechanisms will be established. With a view to intensifying 
the harmonisation of Turkey's legislation and practice with the acquis, the 
Commission is invited to prepare a process of analytical examination of the acquis. 
The European Council asks the Commission to present a single framework for 
coordinating all sources of European Union financial assistance for pre-accession. 
. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Table 1. Trade volume between Greece and Turkey 
(Million €) 
  
Source:  Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mfa.gr) and Kotios A. and G. Petrakos (2003) “The 
Industrial and Trade Structure of the Greek and Turkish Economies: Possibilities for Cooperation”. 
(Volos: University of Thessaly Discussion Papers) (available at: 
www.prd.uth.gr/research/DP/2003/uth-prd-dp-2003-11_en.pdf and  T.A Couloumbis & A. Kentikelenis 
(2007) 
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Table 2. 20 first countries for the Greek exports 
(In million €) 
 
 
 
 Countries  2005 2004 
Increase/decr
ease 
percentage  
1 Germany  1,721.2 1,617.5 6.4 
2 Italy 1,456.4 1,238.5 17.6 
3 United Kingdom 938.7 928.3 1.1 
4 Bulgaria 817.9 779.6 4.9 
5 Turkey 754.1 555.0 35.9 
6 USA 735.3 651.9 12.8 
7 Cyprus  716.9 580.1 23.6 
8 France  577.4 520.9 10.9 
9 Spain  497.6 413.7 20.3 
10 Rumania  408.7 383.4 6.6 
11 Albania  348.5 344.5 1.1 
12 Netherlands  333.0 332.8 0.1 
13 FYROM 327.0 310.3 5.4 
 14 Russia 275.1 268.1 2.6 
 15   
United Arab Emirates 
208.3 104.0 
  
100.3 
 16 Belgium-Luxembourg 190.1 195.0 2.5 
17 Libya  157.7 169.7 7 
18 Syria  157.4 77.3 103.6 
19 Sweden  141.3 128.4 10.1 
20 Poland  134.1 115.2 16.4 
 Ε.U. (25) 7,377.4 6,781.2 8.8 
 E.U. (15) 6,317.8 5,852.2 8 
 TOTAL EXPORTS 13,963.6 12,348.1 13.1 
Source: www.pse.gr & B. Miyisli (2005) 
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Table 3.  20 first states for Greek imports 
 State  2005 2004 
Increase/decrease 
percentage  
1 Germany 5,796.4 5,607.2 3.4% 
2 Italy 5,366.0 5,406.9 0.8 
3 Russia 3,389.5 2,303.7 47.1 
4 France  2,507.0 2,716.4 7.7 
5 Netherlands  2,409.5 2,361.8 2.0 
6 Saudi Arabia 1,805.8 1,287.7 40.2 
7 Spain 1,713.0 1,631.9 5.0 
8 China 1,702.7 1,423.1 19.6 
9 Belgium-Luxembourg 1,569.4 1,589.5 1.3 
10 USA 1,496.5 1,888.7 20.8 
11 Iran 1,488.6 1,155.1 28.9 
12 South Korea 1,178.8 1,724.4 31.6 
13 Turkey 956.7 992.5 3.6 
14 Japan  926.8 1,239.3 25.2 
15 Libya  615.0 290.2 111.9 
16 Switzerland 596.0 602.2 1.0 
17 Bulgaria 589.0 464.4 26.8 
18 Sweden  573.1 624.1 8.2 
19 Austria  457.7 451.7 1.3 
20 Rumania  434.3 503.7 13.8 
 EU(15) 23,561.0 23,664.4 0.4 
 ΕU(25) 24,603.4 24,546.2 0.2 
   
 TOTAL IMPORTS 43,896.8 42,411.3 3.5 
Source: www.pse.gr & B. Miyisli (2005) 
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Table 4. 20 first states for Turkish exports 
(in million dollars) 
 State 2004 2005 
1 Germany  8,745,282 9,453,011 
2 United Kingdom 5,544,303 5,917,074 
3 Italy 4,648,475 5,615,843 
4 USA 4,860,041 4,899,126 
5 France  3,668,418 3,805,577 
6 Spain  2,619,784 3,010,092 
7 Iraq 1,820,802 2,745,921 
8 Netherlands  2,138,004 2,469,036 
9 Russia 1,859,187 2,375,868 
10 Rumania  1,235,485 1,785,090 
11 United Arab Emirates 1,143,728 1,669,719 
12 Israel 1,315,292 1,463,155 
13 Belgium  1,183,181 1,291,594 
14 Bulgaria  894,326 1,178,935 
15 Greece 1,171,203 1,125,693 
Source: www.dtm.gov.tr  
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Table 5. 20 first countries for Turkish imports 
(in $ million) 
 State  2004 2005 
1 Germany 12,515,655 13,618,590 
2 Russia 9,033,138 12,868,349 
3 Italy  6,865,811 7,560,964 
4 China  4,476,077 6,867,358 
5 France  6,201,348 5,883,631 
6 USA 4,745,195 5,371,514 
7 United Kingdom  4,317,140 4,690,092 
8 Switzerland 3,404,540 4,053,558 
9 Spain 3,253,675 3,549,425 
10 South Korea 2,572,537 3,478,586 
11 Iran 1,962,059 3,469,669 
12 Japan  2,684,287 3,106,795 
13 Ukraine  2,509,351 2,639,328 
   
36 Greece  594,351 726,498 
Source: www.dtm.gov.tr  
 
Table 6 Greek-Turkish Tourism 
 
0
100.000
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GR  touris ts  to TR 197.000 280.000 393.000 485.000 585.000
TR  touris ts  to TR 114.000 139.000 144.000 202.000 181.000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Sources: T.A Couloumbis & A. Kentikelenis (2007), p. 526 & Greek Statistical Service 
(www.statistics.gr)   
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